The aim of this article is to explore the question of the limits of experience in light of the phenomenology of violence. I begin by emphasizing the specificity of the phenomenological concept of pre-theoretical experience, in contrast with the traditional concept of experience dominated by theoretical and epistemological motives. Consequently, I underscore that violence can be phenomenologically understood only as a lived experience, given in the first person, belonging to an embodied subject, and placed in an antagonistic intersubjective situation. In order to question how the lived experience of violence discloses the limits of experience, I focus on the concept of the limit and discuss its relevance to phenomenological thought, referring to the limits of phenomenology, limit-problems, limit-phenomena, and limit-situations. I then show that we can differentiate between normal and liminal modes of experience, but we are also dealing with a multitude of levels of experience (visual, auditory, tactile, embodied, affective, intersubjective, comprehensive, and discursive), each of which has its own specific limits. I conclude by analyzing how the phenomenon of violence delineates the limits of experience at each of these levels.
Call for Papers: Studia Phaenomenologica, Volume 27 (2027) “Phenomenological Approaches to Affectivity”. Guest Editors: Claudia Serban & Anthony Steinbock
Call for Papers: Studia Phaenomenologica, Volume 27 (2027) “Phenomenological Approaches to Affectivity” Guest Editors: Claudia Serban & Anthony Steinbock Whether in the context of clarifying the theory of intentionality, uncovering the background of our facticity,...