This paper focuses on a lesser-known aspect of Husserl’s theory of action, namely his understanding of “involuntary behavior,” as developed especially in the recently published manuscripts gathered in Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. Specifically, I follow the arguments leading Husserl in these manuscripts to make the peculiar claim that all involuntary behaviors can be appropriated and converted into voluntary action. In reflecting upon this argument I point out the merits of Husserl’s engagement with involuntary acts, which considerably reshape his practical philosophy, but I also highlight some of its important limitations, which originate in a structural shortcoming of Husserl’s theory in general, namely his presupposition of a rigorous parallelism between cognition, emotion, and action. By showing how this ultimately leads to a reductive and phenomenologically inaccurate view of practical experience, I conclude by pointing to some possible ways to overcome these limitations.
Raport de activitate 2021–2024
Stimați membri ai Societății Române de Fenomenologie, Dragi colegi, Vă prezentăm în cele ce urmează principalele activități și proiecte derulate în perioada 2021–2024 sub egida Societății Române de Fenomenologie, precum și alte informații relevante. Am grupat aceste...