Call for Papers: Studia Phaenomenologica, Vol. XVIII (2018)
EXTENDED DEADLINE: 31 December 2017.
Special Issue: The Promise of Genetic Phenomenology
Guest Editors: Christian Ferencz-Flatz and Andrea Staiti
Despite the ever-growing literature on genetic phenomenology, this area of phenomenological inquiry is still largely obscure. Husserl’s published writings only make cursory references to genetic phenomenology, and the few manuscripts addressing the systematic relation between static and genetic “phenomenological method” are obviously insufficient for a clear assessment of the tensions existing between these two dimensions of Husserl’s thought. Considering that, first, as is well known, “static phenomenology” was originally conceived by Husserl in sharp contrast to genetic inquiries, and, second, that the first and most determinant reception of phenomenology was guided precisely by the project of static phenomenology, Husserl’s turn towards a “genetic phenomenology” should have received considerable attention as a gesture of radical reform. This was not the case: while the reception of the transition from static to genetic phenomenology – which some interpreters even saw as an actual revocation of phenomenology as such – was oddly discrete within the phenomenological movement at the time, Husserl himself downplayed its implications by establishing a seemingly unproblematic continuity between the two. In recent years, however, the project of genetic phenomenology has again received increased attention as a promising venue in Husserl’s thinking, which is now – after some decades in which the interest in the phenomenological method seemed to have receded – claimed to offer both a philosophical renewal of phenomenology and vital new resources for a more fruitful exchange with other disciplines.
This issue of Studia Phaenomenologica is devoted to a global overview of the status and potential of genetic phenomenology. We are particularly interested in topics like:
- the historical evolution of Husserl’s conception of genetic phenomenology
- Husserl’s rejection of genetic psychology in the context of his critique of naturalism
- the systematic role of the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology
- the reception of Husserl’s concept of genetic phenomenology
- alternative attempts to make use of genetic procedures within the phenomenological movement (Heidegger, Scheler, Geiger etc.)
- the specificity of genetic phenomenology in relation to evolutionary psychology or history, but also to traditional uses of genetic inquiries in philosophy (Hume, Nietzsche, Foucault etc.)
- the explanatory potential of genetic phenomenology for other contemporary disciplines (psychology, film studies etc.)
Submission guidelines: http://www.zetabooks.com/journals/studia-phaenomenologica.html
EXTENDED DEADLINE: 31 December 2017.
The papers should be sent to: submissions@phenomenology.ro