Christian Ferencz-Flatz, “The Limits to Owning One’s Behavior: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Involuntary Action”, Human Studies (2024).

This paper focuses on a lesser-known aspect of Husserl’s theory of action, namely his understanding of “involuntary behavior,” as developed especially in the recently published manuscripts gathered in Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. Specifically, I follow the arguments leading Husserl in these manuscripts to make the peculiar claim that all involuntary behaviors can be appropriated and converted into voluntary action. In reflecting upon this argument I point out the merits of Husserl’s engagement with involuntary acts, which considerably reshape his practical philosophy, but I also highlight some of its important limitations, which originate in a structural shortcoming of Husserl’s theory in general, namely his presupposition of a rigorous parallelism between cognition, emotion, and action. By showing how this ultimately leads to a reductive and phenomenologically inaccurate view of practical experience, I conclude by pointing to some possible ways to overcome these limitations.