Heidegger’s philosophical work is driven by a radical criticism of the idealist view that being is posited by the human subject. However, in developing his conception of the finitude of being, Heidegger finds decisive sources of inspiration in the work of Schelling and Hegel. His account of truth as a concealing disclosure of meaning comes unexpectedly close to Hegel’s concept of negativity; this leads him to gradually radicalize his critique of Hegel’s understanding of the concept and to redefine philosophical thinking. Heidegger finds an ally in Schelling and especially in the distinction between being as “ground of existence” and being “insofar as it exists.” He uses this distinction in his efforts not only to undermine the metaphysical quest for self-foundation but also to articulate his own conception of ethos.
Call for papers: Studia Phaenomenologica, Volume 28 (2028): “Phenomenology of Belonging”. Guest Editors: Bruce Bégout and Ovidiu Stanciu
While the concept of belonging does not constitute a central element of the theoretical framework of classical phenomenology, it nevertheless functions as an operative notion that several phenomenologists have drawn upon to articulate a specific dimension of our...