While the concept of belonging does not constitute a central element of the theoretical framework of classical phenomenology, it nevertheless functions as an operative notion that several phenomenologists have drawn upon to articulate a specific dimension of our being-in-the-world. Indeed, some of the most prominent analyses in the history of phenomenology can be read as engaging, either overtly or tacitly, with the phenomenon of belonging and as shedding light on some of its distinguishing features. In this regard, one may refer to Husserl’s analyses of the relation between the home-world and the alien-world, as well as to his account of the generative processes through which human beings become participants in a tradition or historical community; to Heidegger’s inquiries into the phenomena of dwelling, inhabiting, and place, and to his descriptions of the “thing” as standing at the crossroads of the four regions of the world; to Arendt’s characterization of the vita activa and her claim that belonging to the world represents a fundamental condition of human existence; to Gadamer’s rehabilitation of prejudices as the indispensable background of all understanding, and to his thesis that any meaningful relation to the world presupposes the interplay between belonging and distanciation; and to Minkowski’s distinction between the three basic dimensions of human existence, namely “I exist,” “I have,” and “I belong to…”. Within the ambit of classical phenomenology, however, it is undoubtedly Merleau-Ponty who engaged most thoroughly with this topic: his criticism of a pensée de survol (a “view from above”), his insistence on the dynamic and embodied character of the self, and his thesis that any account of the world must necessarily be articulated from within it all imply that subjectivity must be understood as essentially belonging to the world.
Nor should we underestimate the phenomenological reflections—particularly those of the second generation of phenomenologists (Anders, Jonas, Löwith, Arendt)—on the sense of a loss of belonging. They reveal a troubling form of worldlessness (Weltlosigkeit) that stands in contrast to belonging. At the very moment that phenomenology emphasizes the being-in-the-world of all existence, it also observes, due to the changes that modernity introduces into all human life, forms of non-belonging: the subject’s withdrawal into itself, a sense of not participating in the totality of experience, and the acosmism and gnosticism of the man without a world. In a sense, this pervasive tone of world-strangeness (Weltfremdheit) coexists with the theoretical reaffirmation of belonging; it is, as it were, its flip side. The aim, therefore, is also to shed light on this negative aspect of belonging, thereby questioning its fragility. For if belonging appears as a given of all existence, how can it undergo an erasure, or even an eclipse?
In contemporary phenomenology, the concept of belonging has acquired paramount significance and has been addressed explicitly in a wide variety of fields, ranging from social phenomenology to critical phenomenology, and from eco-phenomenology to phenomenological psychopathology. Attempts to develop a phenomenology of social experience and to describe communal forms of relating to the world, as well as approaches aimed at illuminating, from a phenomenological standpoint, contemporary experiential situations such as social exclusion, political marginalization, or exile, make extensive use of the idea of belonging. Similarly, inquiries that seek to provide a comprehensive account of health and mental illness, and to offer phenomenologically informed descriptions of psychic disturbances, highlight the importance of the experience of belonging, showing that alterations in a person’s sense of belonging to the world can induce profound transformations in the overall structure of experience. Moreover, phenomenological explorations of our relations with non-human animals and other life forms, as well as with the natural world, entail a reconceptualization of the various modes of our belonging to the encompassing sphere of existence. Finally, in recent years, the question of belonging has received considerable attention, particularly in French phenomenology. This upsurge of interest is motivated not only by the ambition to subject a relatively neglected phenomenon to critical analysis, to describe its structural moments, and to elucidate its manifold meanings. Rather, the concept of belonging increasingly appears as a theoretical pivot that enables a rearticulation of the conceptual core of the phenomenological project as a whole. Investigations in this vein emphasize that belonging to the world constitutes a fundamental feature of the experiencing subject, and that it is only by virtue of this belonging that an intentional relation to the world can unfold.
We invite submissions that examine the phenomenological concept of belonging from either a historical or a systematic perspective, as well as contributions that assess its potential to elucidate other core dimensions of phenomenological discourse. We further welcome papers that consider its function within particular fields of phenomenological inquiry, including, though not limited to, social phenomenology, critical phenomenology, eco-phenomenology, and phenomenological psychopathology.
Deadline: March 30, 2027.
Submission Guidelines: https://zetabooks.com/library/journals/studia-phaenomenologica/
Contact: Papers should be sent to submissions@phenomenology.ro (subject line: Studia Phaenomenologica 2028)