



# SHIFTING ROLES

## The Manifold Identities of Phenomenology

The 5<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Central  
and East European Society for Phenomenology

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**26–28 September 2019**  
**BUCHAREST**



Organized by  
The Romanian Society for Phenomenology  
ICUB-Humanities (University of Bucharest)  
The Central and East European Society for Phenomenology

## Argument

Looking back at phenomenology's century-long history, one is particularly struck by the puzzling variation of its function, that is, by its changing role and its shifting status as a discipline. Phenomenology, prior to being established as a "science" by Husserl, was already in use as a "method" in the natural sciences as well as in psychology. In its first years, phenomenology was conceived only as a preliminary technique for clarifying fundamental concepts, and not as a philosophical discipline in its own right. Even Husserl's early interpretation of phenomenology as "descriptive psychology" still implied such a subordinate function. It is only after the publication of the *Ideen* that phenomenology actually acquired the status of a philosophy proper, which came along with Husserl's "radicalisation" of the phenomenological method and his construction of the ultimately paradoxical concept of "pure phenomenology". However, his tendency to regard phenomenology as an incarnation of "first philosophy" was soon challenged by thinkers like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Schütz, Levinas or Ricoeur, for whom a "pure phenomenology" was no longer defensible. Consequently, they variously reshaped the place of phenomenology in relation to traditional philosophy and metaphysics, as well as to the human and social sciences, in the context of which the phenomenological method simultaneously developed a still on-going parallel history. In more recent times, this diversification of its functions proliferated with the advent of neo- and post-phenomenological platforms, with the repurposing of phenomenological elements in deconstructivist and critical projects, or with hybrid attempts to merge phenomenological procedures with those of the empirical sciences, most notably in the case of neurophenomenology. In addition to this, it can also be noted that through the works of Patočka, Dragomir or Tischner, phenomenology acquired a different function, as a clandestine social practice, in the specific historical context of Eastern Europe during the Cold War. It is in view of such reflections that the present conference aims to celebrate and question the contemporary versatility of phenomenology, by addressing its manifold shifts in function, its present identity and its possible perspectives, in both a systematic and a historical perspective.

Organizing committee: Ileana Borțun, Cristian Ciocan, Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Paul Marinescu

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26<sup>th</sup> September

10.00–13.15 Registration

13.15–13.30 Institutional Welcome and Opening Remarks

Sorin COSTREIE  
(Vice-rector of the University of Bucharest)

Cristian CIOCAN  
(President of the Romanian Society for Phenomenology)

► Stoicescu Room – 1<sup>st</sup> floor

Keynote Speaker

**26 September**

13.30–14.45

► Stoicescu Room (1<sup>st</sup> floor)

Chair: Bogdan Mincă

## **Bernhard WALDENFELS**

Ruhr-University Bochum

### **Responsivity and Co-Responsivity from a Phenomenological View**

Preliminary remarks: In contrast with intentional, hermeneutic or linguistic variants of phenomenology, I propose a special sort of responsive phenomenology, based on what is happening to us and to which we bodily respond by words, gestures or actions. Generally, to respond means to start from elsewhere. I take the concept of responsivity from various disciplines such as medicine (Kurt Goldstein), gestalt theory (Köhler, Lewin), ethnology (Mauss' theory of gift) and polyphonic linguistics (Bakhtin), making use of it within the field of phenomenological description. Part I is centred on the double event of pathos and response (of *Widerfahrnis* and *Antwort*), and on the diastasis as a temporal shift which at once connects and separates. In case of pathological dissociations arise phenomena like traumas or stereotypes. Part II turns to the social dimension of this approach. In this context I refer alternately to a sort of co-affection, i.e. something happening to me together with others, and to a sort of co-responding by which we respond together with others. We are affected in common, e. g. by an outbreak of war, but we respond to it in different ways. Husserl's intentional community has a pathic ground which includes alienness. Appendix: At last I raise the question to what extent responsivity can be organised and planned in terms of a responsive sort of politics and economics. In this context I refer to the paradox of organising what cannot be organised in accordance with responding to what cannot be answered in the full sense. So we cross the paths of what we call responsive ethics.

## The Ingarden–Blaustein Controversy over a Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experiences

Witold PŁOTKA (*Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Poland*)  
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In his later talk—given on March 17, 1968 in Amsterdam—on phenomenological aesthetics, Ingarden (1975) claims that aesthetic experiences are structured as passive-active wholes which involve both conscious components and a human being understood as an embodied subject. In my paper, I will argue that this holistic and inclusive approach to aesthetic experiences follows from Ingarden’s early (pre-war) discussions with Blaustein—a student of both Twardowski (in Lvov) and Husserl (in Freiburg im Breisgau)—who presents a thorough analysis of the presentational structure of aesthetic experiences as so-called “imaginative presentations.” By arguing this, I offer to explore the Ingarden-Blaustein controversy as an attempt at defining phenomenological aesthetics. Blaustein’s theory of presentations is connected with his critical elaboration of Husserl’s content theory (Pokropski 2015). Blaustein (1937) defines “aesthetic experiences” as complex acts which are founded on perception, and as such they have a primarily passive character. Beyond perception, aesthetic experiences also consist of feelings, judgments, and volitional acts which all constitute subject’s reaction to the aesthetic object. Though the experiences are mainly passive, the subject is, as Blaustein puts it, “strictly active,” and as a result of its activity the aesthetic object (*via* contents) is constituted. Therefore, the object is not given *simpliciter*, rather it arises in a correlation with the subject’s reaction which is described by Blaustein as the “subject’s attitude.”

In the ‘Foreword to the Polish Edition’ of *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, Ingarden (1960: 15) indicates Blaustein as the philosopher who did deepen his own research, also beyond the limits of the philosophy of literature. Nonetheless, under influences of Twardowski, Blaustein’s theory—at least according to Ingarden—felt into psychologism. To omit the problem of psychologism, Ingarden offers in his early phenomenological aesthetics an ontological perspective on the aesthetic object such as the structure of the object itself determines subject’s possible reactions. In a word, the subject is mainly passive. I will argue that Blaustein’s descriptions of the aesthetic attitude enlarge Ingarden’s position to emphasize subject’s active role in the aesthetic experience.

In my paper I will argue that what differentiates Blaustein’s aesthetics objects from Ingarden’s purely intentional objects is its psychic involvement. Whereas for Blaustein the object is strictly a psychic phenomenon, for Ingarden it is purely intentional, and only indirectly can it be connected to the psyche. This difference results in the Ingarden-Blaustein controversy over the method since for Blaustein phenomenological aesthetics has to be developed as descriptive psychology, for Ingarden, in turn, it consists rather in eidetic analysis.

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## Concepts of Dependence and Inseparability in Early Polish Phenomenology

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In my talk I would like to present the development of ideas of dependence and inseparability in early Polish phenomenology. The starting point is the pre-phenomenological theory of object formulated by Kazimierz Twardowski who distinguishes:

1. Mutually separable parts: parts that can be conceived of without conceiving of the others.

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2. Mutually inseparable parts: parts distinguishable but inconceivable without each other.
3. One-sidedly separable parts:  $x$  is one-sidedly separable from  $y$  iff  $x$  can be conceived of without  $y$  but  $y$  cannot be conceived of without  $x$ .

These relationships concern parts, so they can obtain only within a certain whole. Thus these notions cannot cope with such entities which cannot exist without other entities but do not make up any whole with them.

Husserl developed and modified Twardowski's theory of parts and wholes and exposed the theory in a more formal fashion. Although he is not "an early Polish phenomenologist" his doctrine was a point of reference for Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein. Yet Husserlian concept of inseparability (*Unselbständigkeit*) and his part-whole theory cannot express the difference between two types of coexistence: coexistence within a whole and coexistence without making up a whole. Ginsberg-Blaustein tried to modify Husserl's concepts but she did not discern the problem.

Ingarden in his *Bemerkungen zum Problem „Idealismus-Realismus“* elaborated four pairs of so called existential moments. They are ways how some entity is existentially conditioned (or not) by other entity. These pairs are as following:

1. Autonomy – heteronomy.
2. Originality – derivation.
3. Separability – inseparability.
4. Independence – dependence.

All existential moments are essential for a thing—they flow from an essence of a thing. My considerations will focus on the difference between inseparability and dependence. Ingarden defines them (and their opposites) as follows:

$x$  is inseparable from  $y$  iff  $x$  must coexist with  $y$  within a larger whole.

$x$  is separable from  $y$  iff  $x$  does not have to coexist with  $y$  within a larger whole.

$x$  is dependent on  $y$  iff  $x$  is separable from  $y$  but for its existence  $x$  needs the existence of  $y$ .

$x$  is independent of  $y$  iff  $x$  does not have to coexist with  $y$ .

Ingardenian definitions in fact do not express the most important point he emphasized in other contexts. Ingarden distinguished two types of whole: absolute and relative. The first is a whole unified by so called formal relationships, (functions), the second is a whole unified by regular relations. Thus we can improve Ingarden's definition of inseparability:

$x$  is inseparable from  $y$  iff it belongs to the essence of  $x$  that  $x$  must coexist with  $y$  within the larger whole unified by formal relationships.

There are three conditions of being inseparable: (1) necessary coexistence with something else, (2) making up a whole with it, (3) that the whole is tied by non-relational formal functions. In fact the last condition is crucial for inseparability, thus things are dependent not only because they do not make up a larger whole but also if they exist within such a whole but the whole in question is relative.

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## The Problem of Classification of Psychic Phenomena as a Cartesian Motif of Phenomenology: The Case of Kazimierz Twardowski

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Regardless of a popular ascribing the Cartesian character of phenomenology to Husserl, this motif appears clearly already in the descriptive psychology of Franz Brentano and it can be regarded as a set of several specific theses. In the 'Preface' to *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong* (1889), Brentano—rather ahistorical philosopher—emphasizes the importance and originality of the Cartesian motif, by noticing, in his opinion, "two highly significant thoughts", i.e., (1)

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Descartes' classification of psychic phenomena, and (2) "his view about the relation between joy and love and between hatred and sadness" (p. xii, English transl.). In my paper I want to examine to what extent this double motif is present in the thought of the most important Polish student of Brentano, Kazimierz Twardowski. The thesis (1) is undoubtedly central in Twardowski's doctoral dissertation *Idee und Perception* (1892) where Twardowski analyzes the Cartesian *regula generalis*. He states that the clarity and distinctness are distinctive features of true perception, and thus—of judgment, but not of presentations, as Brentano claimed.

As far as the thesis (2) is concerned, although the third class of psychic phenomena—i.e., feelings—seems to be completely absent in Twardowski's epistemological analyzes, Twardowski discusses this class in the text *On the classification of psychic phenomena / W sprawie klasyfikacji zjawisk psychicznych* (1900), and then in his lectures on *Psychology of desires and will / Psychologia pożądań i woli* (1903/4), where Twardowski distinguishes an additional, the fourth class, i.e., the class of will. I will try to show that Twardowski's research was developed strictly in the horizon of Brentano's descriptive psychology, where one of the central motifs is the problem of classification of psychic phenomena, developed in the first-person approach, and within the inner perception. In this regard, my thesis is that it is justified to speak about Cartesianism of Twardowski's thought. This Twardowskian Cartesianism is still focused on a modernization of Descartes' classical theses, however, this attitude results finally in important displacements, e.g., in theory of knowledge it puts an emphasis on the analysis of concepts, and in studies on affective phenomena it seems to lead towards naturalization of the phenomena.

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## The Influence of Husserl's Phenomenology on Post-war French Structuralism

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According to a well-established standard view, which is become a sort of historiographical commonplace, phenomenology and structuralism must be understood as two opposed and largely incompatible schools of thought. Indeed, if the former is pictured as the philosophy of subjectivity *par excellence*, and the latter as the tradition in which the "death of man" is declared, it seems difficult to challenge the above mentioned alleged truism. It is in this sense that Michel Foucault, one of the main figures – although, in many respects, original – of French post-war structuralism, wrote in the English preface to *The Order of Things*: "If there is one approach that I do reject [...] it is that (one might call it, broadly speaking, the phenomenological approach) which gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity – which, in short, leads to a transcendental consciousness" (Foucault 2002).

On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that this picture represents an oversimplification and turns out to be, to a great extent, unsound. Indeed, both phenomenology and structuralism represent complex and composite cultural phenomena and if one looks at the historical circumstances of their emergence and at their core theoretical insights, one can recover many historical and theoretical interconnections among these two key movements of the 20th century history of ideas.

It is exactly this intricate web of relations that the proposed paper intends to highlight. More specifically, the paper intends to stress the historical and theoretical influence of the writings of Edmund Husserl, the founding father of Phenomenology, on Post-war French structuralism. In this paper, special emphasis will be placed on the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, who is usually considered as the "éminence grise" of French post-war structuralism. As is well known, Lévi-Strauss's structural

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anthropology owes much to mathematical formalism, especially to Bourbaki's theoretical insights and, above all, to structural linguistics, first and foremost, to the work of Roman Jakobson. "Lévi-Strauss", François Dosse observes, "elevated [...] linguistics to the rank of a pilot science, of an initial model, basing anthropology on the cultural and social, rather than on the physical. Thanks to Jakobson", Dosse adds further, "Lévi Strauss understood this strategic role very early on" (Dosse 1997). Accordingly, I think that it is possible, as the paper tries to show, to establish a link, via Jakobson and Bourbaki, between Husserl's writings and Lévi-Strauss core epistemological insights.

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## Encountering the Other through Discourse. Phenomenology after Michel Foucault

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While we know that Michel Foucault in his early years has been heavily interested in Husserl and Heidegger, it is widely believed that he cut all ties to phenomenology soon after in order to become the critical thinker and political philosopher we know today. My paper is going to call this established view on the relationship between Foucault's critical project and the phenomenological tradition into question. The influence of phenomenology on the development of Foucault's research method, as I will argue, has been highly underestimated so far. In fact to fully understand the method of discourse analysis you have to trace it back to Foucault's early phenomenological enquiries. But more importantly, I am going to point out that Foucault's incorporation of the phenomenological method also transforms phenomenology as such in significant ways.

Foucault's re-definition of Kant's mode of *critique* shaped his phenomenological approach as well: rather than asking about the formal conditions of the possibility of meaning, he now questioned the factual conditions of its actualization. As Foucault pointed out, an articulation of meaning is always a bit more than a straightforward representation of intention. The act of articulation comes with its own mass, its own gravity and its own dynamics. More than just being a representation of meaning, it points to the conditions of its possible fulfilment, which in turn regulate the likelihood of a meaning's actualization. While this concept isn't all new to Husserl's phenomenology, as the possibility of adequate perception and objective meaning relies on it, Foucault operationalizes this phenomenon in order to establish a distinct form of analysis.

In addition to that he introduces two major corrections regarding Husserl's positions on perception and fulfilment: 1) Coming from Heidegger, Foucault questions the predominant role of perception as the only proper mode of fulfilment. Imagination, rather than being a privative mode of encountering the world, is introduced as a mode of existential orientation, pointing towards the existential conditions of fulfilment. 2) Moreover Foucault managed to establish *discourse* as a third independent mode of experience – discourse being an original mode of encountering the Other as such –, therefore pointing towards the discursive, i.e. intersubjective, conditions of fulfilment and actualization, opening up the possibility of what he then calls *discourse analysis*.

I want to highlight that untangling the phenomenological foundation of Foucault's methodology will not just provide a better understanding of Foucault's work himself, but it will systematically reveal an otherwise under-represented field of phenomenological enquiry: The *political* nature of human experience.

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## From Experience to Epistemology – An Unallowed Shift? Robert Musil’s Defence of Phenomenology Against Machian Phenomenalism

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“Experience”, states the Austrian writer Robert Musil in his philosophical dissertation *On Mach’s Theories* (completed in 1908 under Carl Stumpf in Berlin), “teaches us to recognize the existence of astonishing regularities” (Musil 1982, p. 79), thus summarizing the key argument of his critique of Mach’s views: In fact, Musil rejects both Mach’s sensualistic version of psychophysical parallelism and his empiriocriticist phenomenism on grounds that reveal him as an original disciple of Stumpf’s, set to leave his master’s ideas in favour of a position much closer to Husserl’s, just as the latter had found his own stance a decade earlier by distancing himself from Mach (cf. Sommer 1988, p. 311).

In my paper, I shall discuss the peculiarities of each of these different, yet intertwined movements in their historical as well as systematic context to put forward my conviction that Musil’s approach deserves to be acknowledged as a philosophical contribution *sui generis* to the discussion between phenomenism and phenomenology: Musil neither conveniently reiterates the line of Stumpf (which eventually leads to Gestalt theory) nor simply appropriates the view then held by Husserl (who would soon after proceed to transcendental phenomenology), but develops a genuine stance in whose centre we encounter his very own concept of “experience” which later also underlies his literary work – most prominently, the unfinished novel *The Man Without Qualities* (1930 sqq.). By “quality”, the English translation of the title renders the original German term “Eigenschaft”, whereas the English translation of the dissertation decides to translate the same concept as “property”; in any case, Musil associates “quality”/“property” on the one hand and “experience” (“Erfahrung”) on the other in such a manner that from the latter unavoidably emerge certain “regularities” that cannot be assigned neither to the subject of experience nor to the object experienced – and yet they seem to transcend the sphere of mere sensation in the direction of what might be called transcendental necessity.

One is reminded of what Husserl sometimes referred to as “Erfahrungsstil” (cf. Husserl 1962, pp. 63 sq.; cf. also Orth 1991 and Luft 2002). There is, Musil writes, “at least something already to be found in the experiences to which Mach appeals that pushes toward forming the concept of a property” (Musil 1982, p. 42), in other words: The dependence between perceptive experience and conceptual property must not be misunderstood as merely arbitrary – for conceptualization *qua* idealization is “founded in experience” (Musil 1982, p. 79). Given that in this very respect it does seem *necessary*, the question remains if it therefore may also be considered *transcendental* in the Husserlian sense.

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## Myth, Truth, and History. On Patočka and Ricoeur

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My paper aims at exploring the function ascribed to the concept of “myth” within the works of Jan Patočka and Paul Ricoeur as well as the reasons which led these two philosophers to take up the task of providing a philosophical analysis of the myth. More precisely, I intend to lay out and unpack the claim – which both authors state – according to which there is a peculiar and authentic “truth of the myth”, irreducible to its etiological function and exceeding any allegorical interpretation. Furthermore,

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I will claim that their works provide us with the conceptual tools necessary to advance a genuine phenomenology of the myth.

For both Patočka and Ricoeur, the analysis of the myth is embedded in a broader discussion where “historicity” functions as a counter-concept. In his *Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History*, Patočka contrasts the mythical (or prehistorical) life, determined by the primacy of the past and by the absence of problematicity, with the historical life which springs out of the experience of the loss of any pre-given meaning, of the shaking of all existing grounds, and thus of the emergence of problematicity as such. While in this text Patočka insists on the one-sidedness specific to the mythical attitude and on its incapacity to capture the “appearing as such”, in other works from the 1970s (as, for instance, in the essays he devoted to Sophocles), the Czech philosopher underlines the irreducible truth the myth as such entails: precisely because the knowledge it contains was not obtained against the backdrop of any *skepsis*, because it didn’t have to endure and overcome the negativity of doubt, the myth appears as a valuable guide for assessing our primal contact with the world, the *Urdoxa* upon which all knowledge rests. Thus, the myth entails a specific truth (irreducible to a premonition of science), but in order for it to be made manifest, it requires the intervention of philosophy. It is therefore a second-order truth, a kind of truth that can be expressed only within the space of second-order meaning.

Ricoeur deploys a convergent approach inasmuch as he contends that a philosophical reflection on myths presupposes a distance towards their first-order claims: “For us moderns, the myth is only a myth because we can no longer connect that time with the time of history as we write it” (Ricoeur 1969, p. 5). However, in order to make clear the kind of truth that *we* can legitimately ascribe to the myth, we need to apprehend it not as a merely symbolical construction, but rather as pointing to an experience which can be “re-enacted”: “the stratum of myths [...] refers us back to an experience lying at a lower level than any narration or any gnosis” (Ricoeur 1969, p. 6). Apprehending the truth of the myth involves thus not only to unfold a philosophical hermeneutics, but also to exhibit the different layers of experience on which it is based. As in the case of Patočka, the inquiry into the truth of the myth leads to a renewed analysis of experience, so that myth proves to be a new path for phenomenology.

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### **The Emergence of History. Patočka, Ricoeur and the Heraclitean *Polemos***

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Is the beginning of history itself an historical event or does historicity belong to humanity as such? According to Jan Patočka, historical life does not characterize mankind in general, but is a very specific existential possibility, which consists in the fact of holding oneself within the problematic character of existence, opened by a relation to nothingness as such. This possibility has emerged, in its turn, through a particular event, namely the beginning of political life in the Greek *polis* as “*polemos*”. The importance of the latter for the Patočkian view on history is underlined also by Paul Ricoeur in the French preface of Patočka’s *Heretical Essays*, by explaining that *polemos* is not to be thought as a confrontation that would seek the annihilation of the adversary, but as a confrontation which leads to the differentiation of each of those who take part in it. The differentiation occurs through the *alethic* encounter with all the others in the *agora* as an open space of freedom, which is at the same time the realm of *logos* par excellence. This is where historicity, as a historical event, begins.

The question which we are going to address concerns the conditions of possibility of such an event and implies, therefore, an analysis of the situation which preceded it, namely the pre-historical condition of man and its relation to the divine. If, as Patočka says, nothing can explain, justify or predict the

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emergence of history, one can, nonetheless, phenomenologically assume that such an event, although it is as a break or a cesura, inscribes itself in what we may call – by making use of a Heideggerian term – the “*hermeneutics of facticity*”. The latter implies that each leap – and the emergence of history more than any other – opens a completely new horizon only insofar it carries along with it the domain out of which the leap has been made, leading thus to a reinterpretation of this previous domain as well.

Our intention is, therefore, to describe the pre-historical condition of the Greeks, in order to show, firstly, in what respect were the Greek different from all the other pre-historical societies so as to be able to make the historical leap and, secondly, how does the historical caesura as such lead to a reinterpretation of the Greek pre-historicity. By considering the Ricoeurian interpretation of Patočka and the Patočkian *Heretical Essays*, the key notion around which we are going to center our analysis is the one of the Heraclitean *polemos*, which Patočka identifies as the main element that governs the political life through which history emerges. If *polemos*, as Patočka says, is no longer a god or another, but the only divine law which assures the unity in differentiation of the *polis*, opening the human existence to nothingness as such, what we will try to show is that this openness was made possible precisely by the way in which the pre-historical Greeks related themselves to the divine.

Our claim is that the problematical aspect of existence and the presence of nothingness as such characterizes the way of being-in-the-world proper to the Greeks insofar as their relation to the divine does not place them in a continuity with the latter – as it is the case in the other pre-historical societies described by Patočka –, nor in a fallen world governed by an absolute transcendence – as it is the case in Christianity. From the moment when, in the Greek world, the divine appears as *polemic* and *alethic*, i.e. as *the extraordinary* which pervades the ordinary and which renders the latter fundamentally unfamiliar, man constantly abides by the uncanniness of the existence and the path for the historical leap is held open.

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### **Phenomenological Perspectives on the Historical Condition. Ricoeur and Patočka**

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The aim of my paper is to examine Ricoeur and Patočka's complex manner of reception the Husserlian and the Heideggerian theories about time and history. Firstly, I'll seek to discover certain *similarities* in the critiques Ricoeur and Patočka addressed both to Husserl and Heidegger, more precisely to their transcendental idealism and existential analytics. For instance, if in Husserl's case, their criticism is aimed at the unfounded pre-eminence of the apodictic evidence of the self-giveness of the consciousness over the world horizon and at the conflict between the plurality of consciousnesses and the singularity of history, in the case of Heidegger from *Time and Being*, Ricoeur's and Patočka's objections take into account his single-sided interpretation of temporality and historicity in terms of *Sorge*.

Secondly, my analysis will highlight a *complementary* report between the manners in which Ricoeur and Patočka appropriate their phenomenological sources within their interpretation of history. Thus, if Husserl's *Krisis* represents in Ricoeur's eyes a late but welcome breakthrough regarding the importance that the antepredicative dimension has for any ideality, from the same work, Patočka retains instead the ethical aspect that Husserl attached to the interpretation of the history of humanity. If Ricoeur exclusively refers to Heidegger from *Being and Time*, and to his original problematization of time as a whole, Patočka insists upon Heidegger's late writings, from which he innovatively recovers the idea of the retreat of being as a positioning into the sphere of the problematic, defining the historicity. All these complex references to the phenomenological tradition of questioning the problem of time, bearing critiques and appropriations, lead to different results at the level of the Ricoeur's and

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Patocka's theories about history. These different configurations will be analyzed in counterpoint, pursuing a layered determination of the historical condition: one time as a dynamics between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation, the other time as the shaking of a given meaning from the pre-historical epoch and as an exposure to the problemat�city of the world.

These levels of research will be developed under the unifying ideathat the "heresies" that stay at the foundations of Patocka's and Ricoeur's philosophies of history areneither alienating nor distancing forms from the corpus of the phenomenology. They are instead necessary ways of reaching to the profound meaning of the phenomenon of history, a meaning which reveals itself only by appropriating the finitude and the problemat�city of our historical existence.

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17:00-17:15 Coffee break

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### **"The Self, Returning to Himself as the Other" in the Works of D. A. Prigov**

Natalia ARTEMENKO (*St Petersburg State University, Russia*)

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Comparing the aesthetic experience to the phenomenological one is the highly extensive realm of research. My report increases focus just on one of its aspects, i.e. as parallels between the phenomenological problem of identity and "aesthetic depersonalization" given in the works of Dmitry Alexandrovich Prigov (1940-2007), a Russian poet, artist, one of the founders of The Moscow Conceptualist, prominent figure both in art and literature. I would like to assume that phenomenology and the aesthetic program of D. Prigov represent the examples of two different ways of expressing the same experience.

Currently, scientists and researchers have been making more and more reference to the problem of "the Self" posed by Prigov. While "a traditional reader" used to regard the Author as an author-creator of the certain texts, the current Author turned into a creator of both "new subjectivities" and "a new type of subjectivity", I assume the necessity for distinguishing two aspects within considering the problem of identity, i.e. "the Other as the Self" and "the Self as the Other". In order to analyze the latter aspect, it is necessary to refer to the concept posed by P. Ricœur, generalized by him in "Oneself as Another". Distinguishing between "identity-from-*idem*" and "identity-from-*ipse*" posed by P. Ricœur makes it possible to describe the very type of solution to the problem of constructing an identity model that was posed by D. Prigov. "An capability of being both oneness and diversity", which is postulated as a priori for a subject who is aware both of his wholeness and simultaneous variability, can be described through the dialectic of "sameness", "self-identity" (*idem*), consistency for "the Self" at each point in time, and, on the other hand, "selfhood", "otherness" (*ipse*). It allows for an individual statement to be regarded as a result of some complex *epistemological game*, a subject explores the limits of experience of "the Self" and experience of "the Other" within.

It is just this very game which can result in emerging of that, which, with reference made to Prigov's poetry, is often called *poly-subjectivity*, which, in this context, can be understood as an capability of experiencing "the Other" as "the Other Self" and "playing through" simultaneously all other identities, adopting experience of "the Other Self". In this regard, a subject turns into a particular case of a tendency of structuring an identity through a multitude of other "*identit *". The acknowledged distance between "the Self" and "the non-Self" and their discursive models allows Prigov to implement the strategy of *flickering*, accumulating experience of any kind. Any discursive practice in order to

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"flicker" should be seen as a discourse over a certain distance. Likewise, for experiencing the experience of "the Other's" identity, it is necessary to see this identity as "the non-Self". "The Self" is always presented for "the Self" as "the Other." The otherness of the "the Self", who takes himself for "the Other", can captivate poet's imagination for the very reason that it is just a game of the Self-identical, i.e. as it is stated by E. Levinas, self-rejection of "the Self" belongs exactly to the modes of self-identification of "the Self". Rephrasing the statement made by Levinas we might say that a subject identifies himself in the diversity as in the identity. The gap between "the Self" and "the non-Self" gives a space for an "artist-character" to emerge and act as some meta-personality, accumulating experience of "the Other Self" with regard to this subject. Prigov's "artist-character" integrates the oneness "the Self" that was conceived a priori as infrangible.

The correlation between experience and the specifics of the subject area of a text was emphasized by M. B. Yampolsky, who was the first to see the similarities in the strategies of F. Pessoa and D. Prigov. Such "multiplication of the Self", proliferation of "Self" is isomorphic to F. Pessoa's heteronyms. Such handling the plurality of "the Self" implies the change of attitudes, i.e. it is necessary to halt the natural attitude and shift towards the "aesthetic", essentially phenomenological attitude in order to pursue phenomenology and in order to become an "artist-character". It is the concept of "the Self, returning to himself as the Other" posed by Prigov, that I will dwell upon in my report.

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## The Reception of Husserl's Phenomenology in the Philosophies of Nicolai Hartmann and Vasily Sesemann

Dalius JONKUS (*Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania*)

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Michael Landmann argued that Hartmann was polemical about historical phenomenology, but that he did so on the basis of the idea of phenomenology, thus the overcoming of phenomenology in his work should be treated as a continuation of it (Landmann 1951, 69). Christian Möckel, in an article dealing with the question of whether Hartmann was a phenomenologist, also came to the conclusion that this author had creatively used the phenomenological method, but was never an orthodox phenomenologist (Möckel 2012, 125). In agreement with many of these conclusions, I argue in this article that Hartmann with his critique, from the perspective of phenomenology, makes it possible to raise a new question about intuition and its significance in phenomenology. On one hand, Hartmann recognizes the significance of phenomenological intuition. On the other hand, he points out its limits. The discussion about intuition leads to a question about phenomenological givenness. Is it a sufficient basis for knowing? Is the question of givenness have to be related to the knowing of the whole that Hartmann links with theoretical construction and reconstruction. In my opinion, Spiegelberg mistakenly states that Hartmann fully recognizes phenomenological intuition. I think that the significance of such intuition in the aesthetics of Hartmann is irrefutable, but in his critical ontology, Hartmann seeks to combine the description of phenomenological givenness with dialectics that reconstruct the contexts of givenness and the analysis of the layers of being.

In order to better understand the relationship of Hartmann's philosophy to phenomenology, I cross-examine the latter with another author who is little known and undeservedly forgotten, namely Vasily Sesemann (1884-1963), who from his teenage years and until death, sustained friendly relations with Hartmann.

Sesemann's philosophy is in many aspects similar to Hartmann's. Both of them were influenced by the ideas of the Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky (1870-1965) about the meaning of intuition in knowing, they were both formed while being influenced by the Neo-Kantian ideas of the Marburg School, and they both discovered phenomenology as an alternative to Neo-Kantian idealism. Though

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it should be noted that the reception of phenomenology in their works is critical. Recognizing the significance of phenomenological intuition and description, they both criticized the idealism of Husserl's phenomenology. On the other hand, they were well acquainted not only with the phenomenology of Husserl, but also with that of Max Scheler (1874-1928), Alexander Pfänder (1870-1941), Moritz Geiger (1880-1937), and other phenomenologists. As a result, they understood phenomenology as a method that helps solve philosophical problems. The comparison between Hartmann's and Sesemann's positions from the perspective of phenomenology allows us to take a wider perspective and to see a more general tendency of the reception of Husserl's phenomenology. What will be shown are not only the similarities, but also the differences. Sesemann often discussed with Hartmann's philosophy, directly and indirectly; he further developed some of his ideas and rejected others. Hartmann described his philosophical position as a "critical ontology," whereas Sesemann called himself a "critical realist."

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### **Figures of Infinity. Laszlo Tengelyi and His Students, and Balazs Mezei on the Possibilities of Phenomenological Metaphysics**

Bence Peter MAROSAN (*Budapest Business School, Pazmany Peter Catholic University*)  
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In my presentation I would like to treat two basic sorts of phenomenological metaphysics: one we can find in Laszlo Tengelyi (and in many of his students in Hungary and outside Hungary: such as Laszlo Komorjai, Adam Takacs, Tamas Ullmann, Zsigmond Szabo, and also – in Wuppertal [now in Grenoble] – Inga Römer), the other in Balazs Mezei. Laszlo Tengelyi in his last, posthumously published work, *Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik* (2014) elaborated a vision of phenomenological metaphysics which was the categorical analysis of experience, and which was led by the idea of universal openness of experience. It was a metaphysics of experience which Tengelyi connected with Edmund Husserl's conception of metaphysical primal facts (*metaphysische Urfakta, Urtatsache*). Such metaphysical primal facts serve as foundation of experience; which are on the one hand contingent, but on the other hand cannot be separated from experience either. Following Husserl Tengelyi highlighted four basic types of metaphysical primal facts (ego, world, intersubjectivity, historicity [cf. *Welt und Unendlichkeit*, pp. 184f]), but – keeping in mind the inherent openness of experience – Tengelyi admitted the possibility of an infinite number of such primal facts. Tengelyi, in a somehow Kantian manner, restricted phenomenological metaphysics to this categorical analysis of experience – and excluded from his conception of metaphysics the classical metaphysical questions (concerning e.g. the immortality of soul or the existence God), labelling such problems as non-philosophical, as belonging to the sphere of *world-views*, which he distinguished sharply from philosophy, (op. cit. p. 212). Balazs Mezei also strove after a phenomenological metaphysics or a phenomenological reform of metaphysics – just like Tengelyi. Similar to Tengelyi, in Mezei the idea of openness was also an essential feature of experience, and a fundamental component of his formulation of phenomenological metaphysics. Different from Tengelyi, in Mezei's opinion philosophy cannot give up his claims to raise, elaborate and answer such classical metaphysical questions, which were about e.g. the fate of soul after death or the existence of God, which Tengelyi excluded from the authority of philosophy. The works of Mezei from the outset (since his earliest philosophical works) were motivated by a theological stance, he tried to elaborate a phenomenological theology, whose ultimate topic was the Absolute as the divine aspect of reality, (that is to say: God as Absolute). Mezei explicates his of phenomenological metaphysics in a partly upside-down manner; that is to say: it is the idea of ultimate, infinite divine region of Being which organizes his trains of thoughts and philosophical efforts; it is in

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the focus of his philosophical interests. Mezei connects this problem-field with the problem of truth and revelation, and he attempts to clear up the conditions, ways and structure of the self-revelation, self-givenness of the absolute region or aspect of Being. (*Religion and Revelation after Auschwitz*, 2013, *Radical Revelation*, 2017).

I would like to interpret Mezei's conception of phenomenological metaphysics as a kind of extension of Tengelyi's idea of metaphysics. I try to show that they present two different layers or levels of metaphysics, which belong together necessarily.

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## **Temporal Experience in Pain, Suffering, and Illness: A Conceptual Framework**

Uldis VEGNERS (*University of Latvia, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology*)

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Time is one of the central issues in phenomenology of medicine and phenomenological psychiatry, because an illness brings about changes and disruption not only in our everyday embodied experience in the world, but also in our temporal being in its relation to the events in the world. There is a steadily growing amount and variety of phenomenological analyses of time experience in different forms of suffering and illness, which have become increasingly sophisticated in applying a variety of conceptual distinctions (see, e.g., contributions in recent decades by S. Kay Toombs, Thomas Fuchs, Matthew Ratcliffe, Saulius Geniusas, John Brough, and Louis Sass). Fuchs's and Geniusas's efforts should be especially noted here because of their attempts at a general conceptual framework that could be used for the analyses of changes and disturbances in temporal experience in somatic and psychiatric illnesses. Fuchs proposes to analyze experience of time in terms of implicit and explicit temporality, as well as in terms of subjective and intersubjective temporality, while Geniusas draws distinctions between subjective and objective temporality, implicit or pre-reflective and explicit or reflective temporality, and temporal moments and temporal fields. However, the proposed conceptual frameworks for the analysis of temporal experience could be improved by bringing even more clarity, precision and refinement in their conceptual distinctions.

In this context my aim is to outline a conceptual framework with a greater conceptual clarity, precision and refinement than provided in Fuchs's and Geniusas's frameworks. I will do that by primarily drawing on the distinctions found in Husserl's phenomenology of time. The proposed framework consists of five main distinctions, and many of them imply subdistinctions. Firstly, I will argue that based on Husserl's phenomenology of time it is possible to discern not one, as it is usually done, but three different meanings of the distinction between subjective and objective time, namely, time of experience vs. time of the world, time of lived experiences vs. time of intentional objects, and time of ownness vs. time of intersubjectivity. Then, I will draw a distinction between pre-reflective and reflective time, and, lastly, a distinction will be drawn between egoic and non-egoic time. These distinctions with their subdistinctions, as I will argue, could serve as a general framework for more fine-grained systematic analyses of the experience of temporality in pain, suffering, and illness within phenomenology of medicine and phenomenological psychopathology.

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## The Saturated Phenomenon of Flesh and the Mineness and Otherness of the Body in Illness

Māra GRINFELDE (*University of Latvia, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology*)  
Email: mara.grinfelde@gmail.com

During the last few decades many thinkers have advocated for the importance of the phenomenological approach in developing the understanding of the embodied experience of illness (Richard Zaner, Drew Leder, *Kay Toombs, Jenny Slatman, Havi Carel and Fredrik Svenaeus among others*). In their attempts they have questioned the relationship between body and self in illness, leading to the discussions of mineness and otherness of the body, experience of alienation and the fact that in illness I experience the body simultaneously as both myself and an alien being.

The goal of this paper is to elaborate the different meanings of the mineness and otherness of the body in illness with reference to the interpretation of the body as the saturated phenomenon, inspired by the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion. According to this account, different experiences of otherness and mineness of the body can be traced back to the relationship between the body and the self. I will argue that Marion's insights into the relationship between the saturated phenomenon of flesh (unconditional givenness of affections) and the self allows one to distinguish between two sources of otherness and mineness of the body. This will be done by using the distinction between two expressions of the self – the constituting subject and the affected self (*l'adonné*). I will claim that 1) although the experience of the body as the “other” in the literature of the phenomenology of medicine for the most part has been associated with the experience of the body as a thing or object, the otherness of the body in illness comes not only from the successful objectification of one's body as a present-at-hand thing (objective otherness), but more fundamentally from the unsuccessful objectification, namely, from the attempts at trying, but failing to objectify the given flesh (non-objective otherness). I will also show that 2) the mineness of the body in illness comes both from the affective givenness of the flesh (felt mineness) and from the successful objectification of the flesh (functional mineness) – I can experience my body as myself based on both immediate givenness of affections (feelings of pain, for example) and the implicit sense of control over it (having a prosthesis, for example).

At the end of the paper, I will both sketch out the possible ways these modes of otherness and mineness are intertwined within the experience of illness and consider some of the strategies of a sick person in dealing with illness, based on her identification either with the autonomous subject who is in control or with the affected self who is being given over to herself from the feeling flesh.

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## “Il faut défendre la subjectivité.” Levinas and the Weak Power of the Ethical

### Subject

Guelfo CARBONE (*University of Roma Tre*)  
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Emmanuel Levinas conceived ethics as a contestation of what he called “ontological imperialism” and its asphyxiating order dominating Western culture (Levinas 1969), arguing that, rather than ontology, ethics is “first philosophy” (Levinas 1989). Supported and led by a phenomenological description of the concrete life of the embodied subject, his philosophical work pursued this task by emphasizing the exceptional ethical significance of subjectivity, which

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undermines the will and powers of the sovereign subject, thus outlining an ethics after autonomy (Haker 2004).

The first part of the paper deals with the crisis of the sovereign subject who is pressurized by unlimited responsibility as revealed through the traumatic experience of being in proximity to the Other. Indeed, according to Levinas, in the concrete experience of proximity, the face of the Other visits me with an appeal that claims me to be responsible to and for others, and such a responsibility calls my freedom into question (Calin 2005). In this context, the extreme vulnerability of the Other, together with the absolute passivity of the embodied subject, define the dual system of moral obligation (Franck 2008), and proximity becomes a paradoxical situation in which the “I” is, at one and the same time, both held “hostage” (Levinas 2011) and elevated to a finite, difficult freedom (Levinas 1990a).

However, insofar as it is a radical critique to ontological imperialism, Levinas’s account of ethics also addresses the philosophical drama of ontological plurality (Critchley 2015). Proximity is upset by the visit of the “third,” and the third is the source of justice (Levinas 1998a) that invests me with responsibility not only for my neighbour, rather, for all human being. With respect to the strategy of the primacy of ethics over ontology, justice is construed as a demand for rectification of the asymmetrical relationship that defines the intrigue of ethics.

Accordingly, the second part of the paper illustrates what happens when we move, with Levinas, from the dual system of morality to social plurality, to the “contemporaneity of the multiple” (Levinas 1978), namely, to politics. Indeed, ethics only accounts for moral obligation but not yet for justice (Cohen 2013), being justice the responsibility for all the other, even those who are not in the face-to-face relation with me. The paper argues that as Levinas’s account of ethics is confronted with ontological pluralism, namely, when ethics meets politics, the obsessed and persecuted subject (re)gains, as a political subject, weak powers and fragile rights, which are indispensable in order to be equal among equals.

The closing remarks sketch out how the conflicting simultaneity of ethics and politics, as Levinas stressed, again and again, outlines the question concerning nihilism as the problematic core within the strategy of the primacy of ethics over ontology.

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## Levinas and Ricoeur: From Being-Affected by Time to Historical Experience

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My goal is to move from a reconstruction of the divergence in how Levinas and Ricoeur address the question of fundamental temporalization towards a complex model of historicity capable of engaging with recent transformations in our experience of time. Ricoeur begins from the temporal strata of being-affected by time as a problem, maintaining Augustine’s negative investment in *distensio*. By way of resolution, he transitions towards a model of historical experience elaborated across a conversation between Hegel and Koselleck. Levinas, on the contrary, begins from the problem of the Hegelian model of theodicy, which is entirely drained of normative investment. This normativity is in turn reinvested in the moment of being-affected by time, with memory as an ambiguous intermediary stage. His positive re-investment in being-affected by time is marked by his use of the term *diastasis* rather than *distensio* - an elusive appeal to a Neoplatonic vocabulary which requires for its intelligibility the mediation of Jankelevitch. While pursuing different trajectories, from being-affected by time to historical experience and from historical experience to being-affected by time alternatively, the same imperative drives both transitions: to be precise, the ethical imperative which the intersubjective dynamic embodies at a phenomenological level. For Ricoeur, it is the need for intersubjective agreement which provides the

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impetus behind the transition towards the horizon of the oneness of time and thus to historical consciousness. Levinas underlines how the diastasis of the soul across the constitution of time and the relation to the other are analogous dynamics in that they both embody forms of 'immanent transcendence'. That the same principle of intersubjectivity leads us in different directions suggests a possibility: I wonder whether we might not assemble both trajectories around a multifaceted understanding of intersubjectivity, arriving thereby at a more fluid model for transitioning between temporal strata. The value of so doing becomes clear once we address what are presented by some as pathologies in our contemporary modes of temporalization. For example, the problem of distension as Ricoeur addresses it has been extended by Hartog to form a diagnosis of the contemporary 'crisis in time' brought about by the temporality of finance capitalism, the revolution in information and globalization. The schism between space of experience and horizon of expectation, a theoretical possibility for Ricoeur, has for Hartog become a reality: we are confronted with a present which has expanded to 'become its own self-enclosed horizon'. Another aspect of distension emerges under the 'tyranny' or 'hypertrophy' of memory: Huysen, for example, reflects Ricoeur's enriched model of distension by noting the breaking apart of time into incommensurable aspects, or 'the clashing and ever more fragmented memory politics of social and ethnic groups', symptomatic of the turn to memory. Gumbrecht, closely following Hartog in his reading of our present as a de-temporalized 'dimension of expanding simultaneities', concludes that 'we no longer live in historical time'. By means of a complex model of historicity, which passes more fluidly between being-affected by time and historical experience, I believe that we can engage more constructively with these developments and resist this notion of the 'end of historical time'.

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### **Narration of Self: Self-discovery or Self-invention?**

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From his reading of Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricoeur will notably catch the notion of *ipseity*, of which he will provide a particular interpretation by integrating it into the concept of *narrative identity* (*Soi-même comme un autre*, Seuil, 1990 ; en. tr.: *Oneself as another*, 1996). In the light of these analyses, the concept of *ipseity* acquires new dimensions. Indeed, the investigation of self-awareness has been extended to include *self-narration*. To be conscious of oneself is to be able to tell, to a certain extent, what this "self" was and what it wants to become or thinks it wants to become. The question of self-narrative and its connexion to phenomenology will be reopened based on perspective of this conceptual history. What does it mean to produce a narration of what we are, have been, or would like to become? How did phenomenology hold of these questions? How did it transform it? More fundamentally: How is self-awareness at stake the narration of the self? Should this narration be regarded as a "discovery of oneself" (discovery of a "self" pre-existing to the narration) or as an act of invention of oneself (creation of a consciousness of itself by the very process of its narration)? Is narrative introspection an unveiling of *ipseity* or a kind of creation of *ipseity*? These are the questions that will be addressed along this communication.

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## Brentano's Misunderstanding of Husserl's "Essences" as Platonic Entities in Descriptive Psychology

Cyril McDONNELL (*Maynooth University, Ireland*)

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In his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874), Brentano adopts an empiricists' position that is committed to clarifying the origin of the meaning of concepts used in the science of empirical psychology through 'the inner perception of our own psychical phenomena'. Brentano never wavered in this methodological conviction when clarifying concepts deployed in the normative disciplines of ethics, aesthetics and logic in his subsequent lectures on descriptive psychology at Vienna University. In Brentano's estimation, then, Husserl's later appeal to eidetic analysis in the descriptive-psychological clarification of concepts in logic in *Logical Investigations* (1900-01) was anathema to any genuine empiricist starting in philosophy, and a return to some form of spurious Platonism. Husserl, however, begged to differ. He believed that his descriptive-psychological studies were 'fully influenced by Brentano's suggestions, and should be readily understandable in view of the fact that I [Husserl] was a direct pupil of Brentano', yet, Husserl also noted that 'the idea of a descriptive psychology has undergone, in the *Investigations*, a new change and also an essential transformation through an essentially new method [i.e., *eidetic analysis*], so much so that Brentano himself did not recognise it as the fruition of his own ideas' (Husserl, *Phenomenological Psychology*, 1925).

The philosophical dispute between Brentano and Husserl, therefore, revolves around the issue of the role, if any, that eidetic analysis occupies in the empirical method of analysis of Brentano's new science of descriptive psychology of intentional consciousness and its objectivities. Without a proper understanding of this critical development, Husserl's thinking can be — as it was *at the time* (and much to his disappointment) — either over-identified with Brentano's school of descriptive psychology or under-estimated as an advancement on Brentano's new way of thinking in philosophy, that is, in 'descriptive psychology'.

This paper examines some of the main features of Brentano's idea of descriptive psychology and views on 'inner perception' that are of most relevance to an understanding and evaluation of Husserl's controversial but crucial argument for the intuition of essences as the method to be deployed in Brentano's new science of 'descriptive psychology' or 'phenomenology'. The paper argues that the philosophical dispute that later unfolds between Husserl and Brentano's respective conceptions of descriptive psychology as a science does so not-so-much arise out of their different elaborations of 'Brentano's thesis of intentionality', though there are major differences here, or through any possibility or impossibility of complete 'transcendental reduction', and there are many differences here too, but in relation to misunderstanding and understanding properly Husserl's doctrine of the intuition of essences.

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## **Brentano and Husserl: Some Unresearched Aspects**

Ion TĂNĂSESCU (*Alexandru Dragomir – Institute of Philosophy / Institute of Philosophy of the Romanian Academy, Romania*)

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The role played by Brentanian phenomenology in the development of Husserl's phenomenology is well known. Yet, despite this, there are still important aspects of the relation between Brentano and Husserl whose significance still remains obscure and requires elucidation. This is due to the fact that there is no clear identification of the modifications that Husserl makes to Brentano's conception, nor of the significance of this conception in relation to the way in which Husserl appropriated it.

In my paper, I *first* present the conceptual framework in the case of two of these problems:

1) Unlike Brentanian descriptive psychology, which is an analysis of the elements of consciousness and of the relations that hold between them, Husserl's descriptive psychology in his *Logical Investigations* is a reflexive investigation of intentional experiences involved in acts of knowing that is characterized by two un-Brentanian approaches: i) it is an investigation that takes place through independent acts, that are not thus included in the lived act—as is the case for Brentano; ii) Husserl attempts to analyse in an abstractive, anti-Brentanian way, the essence of intentional experiences.

This reflexive analysis marks a distancing from the tradition of John St. Mill and Brentano, for whom internal perception and the study of psychical phenomena in immediate memory represented the fundamental method of psychology. This latter method provided Brentano with one of his main arguments against Comte's verdict concerning the impossibility of any psychology founded on inner observation and internal perception.

2) By affirming that physical phenomena are given in the same real manner in consciousness as the psychical ones, Husserl includes them both in the real, descriptive content of consciousness, thereby negating the conceptual ground on which Brentanian psychology is built. At the same time, he rigorously distinguishes between real and intentional content, and connects them by what he calls the apperception of content as 'objective intention'. This term is completely foreign to Brentanian psychology, which is mainly limited to analysing the relation between mental act and its immanent object.

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## **Inducing Phenomenology. Husserl's Early Phenomenology in the Context of Brentano's *Psychognosie***

Alexandru BEJINARIU (*Alexandru Dragomir – Institute of Philosophy, Romania*)

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In my talk, I investigate the relevance of Brentano's discovery of "induction in wide sense" (*Induktion in weitem Sinne*) — a way of knowing apodictic truths at a single stroke (*in einem Schlage*), without deriving them step-by-step from a number of individual empirical cases — for Husserl's phenomenological method of *pure description*.

I set out from Husserl's statement in the first edition of his *Logical Investigations* (1900-01) that "phenomenology is descriptive psychology". He also adds, however, that this manner of proceeding entails a "purely descriptive examination of the knowledge experience, disembarassed [...] from the truly

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psychological researches directed to empirical explanation and origins” (*LI I*, 177). This clearly separates phenomenology from genetic-empirical psychology, but it also implies, as Husserl will later clarify in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations* (1913 and 1921), that the phenomenologist, unlike Brentano’s psychognost (the one that practices descriptive-empirical psychology), no longer starts from *individual factual experiences*, present here and now in inner perception, but from *generalities of essence* (see *LI I*, 166). In the second edition of the *LI* — which Husserl revised after his conversion to transcendental idealism around 1908-1909 and documented in *Ideen I* (1913) — Husserl adds important paragraphs to his original text, in which he introduces the notion of *Wesensintuition*, expanding and clarifying the earlier notion of pure description, while straying even further away from Brentanian orthodoxy.

I argue that in this context of understanding Husserl’s notion of ‘pure description’, of great importance is Brentano’s notion of *one-step induction* or *induction in a wide sense*. For Brentano, induction in the proper (narrower) sense is one that is specific to natural sciences, where by repeated observation on a set of unordered individuals a certain general highly-probable empirical law is induced. However, the shortcomings of this method were well known to Brentano, as such a means of empirical induction could never be used to found laws of ultimate generality or apodictic certainty. On the other hand, one-step induction presupposes the immediate transition, with absolute certainty, from a particular knowledge to the general law. This notion is specific to his later descriptive psychology, and it is one that represents an autonomizing transformation of empirical psychology (dependent on physiology) that, similarly to an *eidetic science*, can offer ultimate apodictic knowledge, beyond any probability. Nevertheless, for Brentano, at the core of this science of a descriptive psychology there are no “ideal essences”, but general laws which present themselves to us with certainty that stem from concepts *gained from (internal) experience*—an experience which, however, does not *ground* the knowledge. What, then, is it that grounds this knowledge, since Brentano rejects any form of intellectual intuition? I attempt to show how Husserl’s method of *pure description* is related to these methodological problems and how it attempts to offer an answer. This is important for a better understanding of the necessity of Husserl’s later notion of *eidetic intuition*, a notion, however, that is entirely unacceptable to Brentano.

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## On the Way to Phenomenology. Structure and Phenomenon in the Early Merleau-Ponty

Francesco PUGLIARO (*KU Leuven, Belgium; University of Pavia, Italy*)  
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The meaning of phenomenology is a central issue in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, to which he returned incessantly throughout his oeuvre. It is particularly at stake in *The Structure of Behavior*, where phenomenology is gained through a close confrontation with the natural sciences. While the philosophical importance of this book has perhaps been eclipsed by Merleau-Ponty’s later works, in my view it already brings about a radical displacement of the philosophical milieu in which he sought to speak. We could say that, in his first book, he found a mode of access to phenomenology via the empirical field of the behavioral sciences, which ultimately led him to abandon the ground of a pure philosophy of consciousness. I therefore believe that an investigation into the movement of this book would provide precious insight into Merleau-Ponty’s redefinition of phenomenology.

An interesting way of approaching this issue is to see how the concept of phenomenon experiences a change of accent in Merleau-Ponty’s analyses. In particular, I will show how his attempt to conceive of the phenomenality of phenomena in terms of structure brings about a reshaping of phenomenology.

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Structure indeed plays a strategic role in his early philosophical enterprise. On the one hand, it has a critical function: as he writes, “A form such as the structure figure-background is a whole which has a meaning, but at the same time it is not an idea” (SB, 224). Inasmuch as it has a meaning, it calls for a critique of realism; inasmuch as it is not an idea, it calls for a critique of intellectualism. On the other hand, it has a constructive function: if we admit that structure cannot be hypostasized, that it is always inseparable from a perceptual structuring, it invites the definition of a new Ego, the incarnate subject. I will develop this theme in three stages. The first part will trace out the emergence of the problem of structure as the beginnings of an overcoming of realism. Here Merleau-Ponty’s confrontation with psychology and biology will play a decisive role. By rejecting the methods of causal explanation, scientists have developed a new analytic of life, which understands behaviour as an expression of indecomposable structures. Structures are therefore not things in themselves, but unities of meaning. In the second part, I will explore the ideality of structure, and the phenomenal field thus opened. Inasmuch as structure is not a meaning applied by consciousness to an external matter, but the emergence of an incarnate sense, it exceeds the distinction between activity and passivity. Structure is ideal in that it is perceived. In the final section, I will present Merleau-Ponty’s gesture as a form of phenomenological reduction. By acknowledging that structure can only be perceived, Merleau-Ponty calls for an *Umstellung* of the natural attitude, which ultimately finds perception as the transcendental field of phenomenological reflection.

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### **Impure *Wesenschau*. On Marc Richir’s Interpretation of Essences in Merleau-Ponty’s Latest Works**

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Marc Richir begins his 1988 book, *Phénomènes, temps et êtres* with a careful reading and interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s last works. More specifically, he develops on the question of essences in *The Visible and the Invisible*. The goal of this paper is to explain how Richir’s reconsideration of eidetics allows him to rethink phenomena as singular and contingent, linking deeply phenomenology, poetics and art. In my first section, I would try to explain the critical-negative moment of the *Wesenschau*. Richir reads the third chapter of *The Visible and the Invisible* as a project of reformulating and reconsidering the classical philosophical (and specially husserlian) problem of the intuition of essences. In other words, Richir will follow Merleau-Ponty attacks on the “overflight thinking“(pensée de survol) and his modern prejudices, denouncing ideation as no more than a fiction. As he says, « (phenomenological) reduction has become abstraction of facticity », or even « perverted in negation of facticity » (Richir 1988: 70-71). In order to retrieve the essence and all its thickness without falling in the trap of the reflexive transparence, we have to grasp the way essence is enrooted in the “wild being”. The intuition of essences, therefore, must be understood in relation to the embodied dimension, and not the phenomenological stance/position of the “uninterested viewer” (*spectateur désintéressé*). Taking this into account, Richir will develop the problem of the ideas as “junctures” (*jointures*), insisting on the dimension of variation that the body is supposed to reveal.

This way of rethinking essences leads Richir to the fundamental problem of truth of/in perception. Following *The Visible and the Invisible*, and other contemporary works, he insists on the degree of truth that all perception includes, and the ontological substitution of one truth for another, as the validity of his appearances is grasped here as the illusion that is always present in what is true. If intuition is not « disembodied vision » anymore, illusion itself becomes a significant and necessary part of the phenomenon as such, and even the illusion of grasping the thing-in-itself, closed and

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transparent, must be reintegrated in the “phenomenality of the phenomenon” (*phénoménalité du phénomène*).

The problem, linked to the philosophy of reflexion, arrives when this moment suffers a reification, described by Richir as : “illusion of a phenomenon perfectly autonomous, one massive or spherical an-sich that nothing more would open to phenomenality, that could be seen without being visible.” Against this point of view, the Belgian phenomenologist unfolds the difficult question of the « originary distortion » of the phenomenon. This allows him to understand the work of Merleau-Ponty on essences as an impure approach of the *Wesenschau*, relating the problem to the french philosopher concepts of « chiasmus » and « encroachment » (*empiètement*), among others. The goal of this second section would be then to explain how this new consideration of essences implies a new consideration of the phenomenon as distortion. From this perspective, the phenomenon is individuated in its contingency, as a moment or pole of the illusion, thought itself in its mobility and its « indefinite determinability ».

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## Phenomenology and Psychoanalytic Theory

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Instituted in response to the growing psychologism of its time, phenomenology was meant to give an account of the subjective dimension of human experience. Far from being strictly quantifiable, human experience is pervaded by the intimate and unique dimension of subjectivity. Thus, one cannot simply assume either that the same psychological laws apply in the same way to each and every one of us, or that one’s experience may be ameliorated or “improved” in virtue of such laws. To assume that would involve a certain form of naivety, in Husserlian terms.

As a matter of fact, Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction targets precisely such a naive attitude. To be more precise, he aims at suspending it in order to access a phenomenological (or transcendental) attitude, from which subjectivity is to be adequately scrutinized. As the intended method for that adequate scrutiny, the newly instituted phenomenology evolves into a “pure phenomenology”, which seeks to uncover the “pure” *ego*.

At this transcendental level, Husserl faces a crucial problem: intersubjectivity. He certainly recognises it as such, and so do many of his disciples. Although he is certain of having solved the problem, not all of phenomenologists agree with him.

One of his prominent critics in this respect is Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who is sceptical about the very idea of a “pure” *ego* and about the ideal of purity it involves. In order to capture the rationale of this scepticism, I turn to another figure who, around the time when Husserl “invented” phenomenology, claimed to “invent” a novel method of inquiry into subjectivity and unveil a new field of knowledge: Freud and his psychoanalysis.

Freud’s psychoanalytic theory emphasises a certain psychological determinism upon the subject. At first sight, this is just another version of psychologism. However, for him the psychic apparatus has a special status: it is the unconscious itself. And given that the workings of the unconscious are not supposed to be the same for each and every one of us, it would be impossible to advance universally applicable psychological laws.

Merleau-Ponty reevaluates the Freudian theory of the unconscious, maintaining that there are parts of the subject which are obscure even to the subject itself. The *ego* is inevitably confronted with a sort of debris he cannot fully comprehend. Merleau-Ponty calls that debris *Wesen sauvage*.

Later on, Marc Richir develops the notion of *Wesen sauvages* into a key element of his theory of meaning. Since it is entangled with the unconscious, meaning is for Richir always in the making, thus

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never fixed or stable, as we would like to think. Because of that, language itself becomes phenomenal and has a transcendental value.

In my paper I intend to readdress these questions put forward by the critique of psychologism. I will show how, in that respect, psychoanalytic theory can join forces with phenomenology, and contribute to a solution to the impasse of intersubjectivity. To this purpose, I will draw on some recent research insights into Marc Richir's conception of language as phenomenon and the twist he gives to the concept of "perceptive" *phantasia* introduced by Husserl in 1918. I will address this concept as the shifting point towards transcendental interfacticity, employed by Richir in order to solve the deadlock of intersubjectivity.

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## **(In)Disputable Words. A Phenomenological Account of the Psychiatric Object and Its Language**

Francesca BRENCIO (*Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Seville*)

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The problem of the name of an illness is not merely the problem of diagnosis, but it is also a problem of words that rises many complicated questions: how can words define and express something of which the borders and patterns are quite mysterious, undefined, and sometimes not accessible by people who experience the illness itself? Can psychiatric nosology and classifications fit with the ontological constitution of human beings? This paper aims to discuss the so-called "psychiatric object" and its language. In doing so, this contribution intends to move towards two levels; at the first level, it will examine the *psychiatric object* and the *language* used to understand, clarify and grasp this object. Psychiatry is a very young field since in its 150 years it has known many changes and difficulties – and perhaps it is still developing, adjusting and modifying, both in theory and practice. The 'psychiatric object' cannot only be defined in terms of illness, diagnosis, symptoms and methodologies able to capture valid phenomenal distinctions concerning the patient's experience.

At the same time, it cannot be reduced to the human organism or some parts of it. The 'psychiatric object' is more complex and has to do with existence and specifically with some forms of existence that are characterized by phenomena that do not allow people to have an ordinary (or extraordinary) life. If existence has to do with the way through which human being has to be (Heidegger 1962), it means that this *modus essendi* has a precise way to manifest itself also among people affected by mental health issues. Psychopathological phenomena can be conceived not as something negative compared to the ordinary way of being but as variations (*Abwandlungen*) of the only and original ontological structure that characterized existence in all its expressions.

At the second level, this paper will show the difference between *taxonomy and ontology*, both of interest of the psychiatric object. Descriptive methods of present day psychiatry tend to perpetuate the problem of description, because these methods, mainly based on the third-person approach to symptoms, are not adequately tailored to the ontological nature of the 'psychiatric object', that is experientially a complete form of existence, a human being in a particular form of existence. Some accounts of mental illness explicitly criticize psychiatric models: the notion of mental illness considered as a 'myth' (Szasz) based on a mistaken analogy between physical illness and psychological distress, or the notion that psychiatric categories (and their practices) are a product of interests of society at large (Foucault, Basaglia), or political and cultural (Laing).

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## **A Phenomenologically-Informed Therapy: The D.I.R.E. Model for the Treatment of the Autism Spectrum Disorder**

Svetlana SHOLOKHOVA (*Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, UC Louvain*)  
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One of the main contributions of phenomenology to psychiatry is the emphasis given on the living body and on a subjectivity conceived as a whole that involves a psyche and a body inextricably entangled to each other. This essential link becomes visible in certain psychopathologies that seem to lie in a break of the (inter)subjective bodily engagement. If the core of subjectivity does not have a theoretical, rational nature, but a pre-reflective, corporeal one, we can therefore hypothesize treatments focused on these latter components. Within this framework, I would like to propose an affective and phenomenologically informed treatment whose goal is the strengthening of the prereflective, intersubjective and kinaesthetic bodily self, for the treatment of those psychopathologies which involve not only an affective, emotional deficit, but also a detachment from the social milieu, in particular the autism spectrum disorder.

Based on these premises, I outline some core features of a therapy that would be based on the idea that the lived body plays a crucial role in the disruption of the person's. The therapy I propose would focus on the fortification of intercorporeality and of bodily awareness. I call this approach D.I.R.E., with an explicit link to the D.I.R. model proposed by Stanley Greenspan and Serena Wieder in 1997 for the treatment of autistic patients. From a methodological point of view, I will combine Greenspan's "affective diathesis hypothesis" with a phenomenological account of subjectivity as a corporeal, kinesthetic entity. My proposal is to transform the D.I.R. model into the D.I.R.E. model, a therapeutic approach that also takes Embodiment into account.

Greenspan's work elicited my interest for many different reasons: his account is not a mere attempt to affirm the importance of emotions in the development of subjective skills, rather the priority attributed to affective *interactions* and *lived experiences* makes his theory a rich source for the understanding of those pathologies which involve intersubjective deficits and gives reasons to think about a fruitful dialogue between his therapeutic proposal and phenomenology, underling the nature of self and the role of intercorporeality in the development of intelligence.

After illustrating Greenspan's developmental perspective, I will propose the D.I.R.E. model (Developmental, Individual difference, Relationship-based, Embodied model). Adding a role for Embodiment, it enlarges the therapy by focusing more specifically on strengthening and recovering the kinaesthetic, corporeal self, which seems to be the real core of subjectivity, and accordingly, of intersubjective, perceptual abilities.

The final aim is to emphasize the modernity and the concrete efficacy of phenomenological notions, and to offer a concrete tool for the treatment of intersubjective and bodily disorders.

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## **Learning and Teaching Phenomenological Approach in Psychiatry Today**

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In the recently published *Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology*, G. Stanghellini (2018) stressed the importance of teaching phenomenological psychopathology to psychiatrists. A few years earlier, S. Gallagher and D. Francesconi (2012) argued that phenomenological training is particularly suitable for researchers and professionals who are interested in qualitative approaches. Whereas the authors of these studies focus almost exclusively on the patient's experience of psychiatric illness,

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in this paper, I will argue that this approach should be complemented with a clinician-oriented perspective. I suggest that a clear understanding of the way the clinician “does” and learns to “do” phenomenology is essential for the existence of phenomenological psychiatry as well as for any other application of phenomenology in human or empirical sciences.

I start by identifying the concept of phenomenological training within the existing phenomenological psychiatric literature and focus on the example of the practice of phenomenological interview. Then I discuss how an almost exclusive focus on the patient’s experience of psychiatric illness risks obliterating the specificity of the phenomenological method and the way the adoption of phenomenological methodology affects the subject of the analysis. More precisely, I will reflect on how, by adopting a new kind of attitude towards her own subjective experience of the clinical encounter and her acquired scientific knowledge, the phenomenologizing psychiatrist develops a specific kind of embodied reflective attitude. I will conclude by outlining new questions and new perspectives that such broadening of the idea of the phenomenological training opens for phenomenological psychiatry.

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### Adorno's Genetic Phenomenology

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There is a certain consensus amongst contemporary phenomenologists dealing with Adorno's criticism of Husserl in saying that, while some of Adorno's objections may apply to Husserl's early writings, they are in any case overthrown when considering in his later thinking and especially his move towards genetic phenomenology. This view generally rests upon the assumption that Adorno was by no means familiar with those later aspects of Husserl's philosophy. Against the backdrop of these interpretations, the present paper intends to show that Adorno indeed was surprisingly well aware of Husserl's genetic turn, in devoting several key reflections to this issue, which may prove relevant for an assessment of genetic phenomenology itself.

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### Late Adorno's Materialism: A Critical Evaluation

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The paper tries to extend and, somehow, ‘return to sender’ Adorno’s critique of Husserl and phenomenology (i.e., that the latter turns into a reconstructed idealism in its very attempt to overcome it). Thus, the paper aims to assess late Adorno’s materialist credentials by analyzing his conceptual framework and discussing it against the background of the historical materialist tradition, focusing on four main directions of interrogation: a) late Adorno’s concept of capitalism (its historical origin, basic mechanism, and contemporary metamorphosis); b) his theory of history (the idealist historical perspective articulated in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and its resonance in Adorno’s later works); c) his understanding of the materialist method (the vicissitudes of the concept of totality, the truth and ideology of science, materialism as the ultimate negative theology); d) and, finally, his late theory of

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practice. With the risk of anticipating conclusions that might, after due research, invalidate our very premises, in all these four conceptual clusters, Adorno's contribution to the historical materialist tradition will be questioned as a retreat and as an idealist (even though negative, imageless) reconstruction, which much resembles the phenomenological positions he criticizes.

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### **Figuring Out Essence. Ideation and Language in Husserl and Adorno**

Amalia TREPÇA (*Alexandru Dragomir – Institute of Philosophy. Romanian Society for Phenomenology*)

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Adorno's theory of the non-identical is famously linked to his model of constellative thinking, which, essentially, describes a way of working with philosophical concepts that both prevents the use of these concepts such that they would lose the connection with the linguistic context from which they originate and ensures that the newly obtained theory does justice to the investigated object. In this respect, Adorno bases from early on his position on reflections on language, underlining its constellative nature and warning against the loss of meaning entailed in the processes of reification and abstractisation that characterise reflective thought. It is fair to say that this particular standpoint is developed in dialog with an important husserlian contention regarding the issue of abstracting essence from intuitive givenness. On the one hand, Adorno praises Husserl for having shown that the general can be obtained through an abstractive process that does not however need to appeal to a comparative run through different individuals, thus establishing a working method that privileges facticity, but on the other hand he also criticizes him for not having seen the alterity that hides in the individual and for thus ending up in a fetishisation of language.

In the first part of my presentation, I will attempt to determine to what extent the understanding of essence based on the relation between present occurrence in space and time and atemporal validity can be suspended by Adorno's idea of a concept's dependence on the citation of other concepts. The second part will discuss whether Husserl's development of genetic phenomenology, which was set to deal with the dependence of our current experience on previous experiences and on the ensuing sedimentation process, might indicate that an account of the alterity that Adorno believes resides at the heart of the object has actually been provided by phenomenology. Thirdly, focusing on Husserl's *The Origin of Geometry*, we will investigate whether Husserl's belief in the possibility of reactivating a whole chain of previous experiences not only within the confines of individual consciousness but most importantly on the basis of language and written records: 1) amounts to assuming a generality which cannot be accounted for and 2) successfully addresses or actually fails to address the issue raised by Adorno, namely the dependence of an object's identity on its immersion in a broader context.

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**Mădălina DIACONU**  
University of Vienna

**Temperature as Object, Medium and Phenomenon**

A fertile direction for the future development of phenomenology regards its extension to previously neglected senses, such as the thermic experience. Whereas the hitherto poor contributions of phenomenology in this field tend to include the feeling of temperature in tactility sensu largo, my lecture argues that this sense requires also a specific analysis beyond the application of general phenomenological assumptions. From an experiential perspective, temperature is not a measurable parameter, but the very medium of life and the object of a pre-conceptual knowledge which is suffused with affective evaluations. First-hand experience and literary descriptions, supplemented by empirical research on thermoreception and homeothermy in biometeorology and evolutionary and environmental psychology, enable to identify, investigate and eventually convey meaning to the following features of the “thermic body”: relative openness and communication with the environment, intersensory connections, porosity, extension, depth, and radiance. In spite of the primary biological function of the thermic sense, its accurate phenomenological interpretation cannot abstract from the implications of cultural and technological thermoregulation, in particular if it is meant to serve as a basis for a social aesthetics of weather and climate.



13:00–14:45 Lunch

## **Phenomenology's Fruitful Overlap with other Disciplines: Reflections on Three Historical Experiences in Central Europe**

Jaroslava VYDROVÁ (*Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava*)  
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Concerning the development of phenomenology in a Central European context, especially in the Czech and Slovak intellectual milieu, we can see that the phenomenological movement was, to some extent, inspiring and productive also in disciplines other than philosophy. There are several concrete reasons for this including the special conditions and traditions of thinking in our region, in which phenomenology was anchored and with which it was confronted. Another important factor was the convoluted and hostile political situation which resulted in an ideologically motivated criticism and a rejection of the phenomenological approach in philosophy in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In my contribution I will examine three concrete examples of the impact of phenomenology beyond the sphere of philosophy: 1. The presence of phenomenology in the theory of literature (demonstrating connections between phenomenology and structuralism), 2. The function of phenomenology in research on everydayness in sociology, and 3. The inspiration of phenomenology for the practical achievement of art in terms of its innovative tendencies (demonstrating connections between phenomenology and fine-art). My analysis will involve not only a collection of concrete historical examples but also a critical reflection on these experiences.

These intersections of topics and disciplines can serve to show us the productive potential of phenomenology, specifically, how it can be inspiring and fruitful for other disciplines, which tools it offers and what kind of cooperation and communication could be developed based on the background of these experiences and this tradition today. This elasticity and versatility can be mutually advantageous. Phenomenology itself can benefit from this by finding new topics and by developing an attentiveness to new problems of the human in the contemporary situation. Further, it can find useful examples for theoretical consideration and motivate and encourage new initiatives. These initiatives can be developed in the cultural milieu of the Central European context, where we are naturally anchored as in our shared tradition from which we can learn and benefit. But there is an even great potential – which is today more natural and appropriate – for cooperation across borders.

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## **Variating Worlds through Formal-Indicating Concepts. On the Possibility of Interdisciplinary Phenomenology**

Fabio Tommy PELLIZZER (*Ca'Foscari University of Venice*)  
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There are countless investigations that present themselves as 'phenomenological'. However, it is not always clear how exactly those investigations make use of phenomenological methods and concepts. I do believe that a methodological reflection on the possibility of interdisciplinary phenomenology might be of help for both philosophers and scientists interested

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in adopting phenomenological methods. In this paper, I contend that such reflection can be carried out by reference to Heidegger's phenomenology. More precisely, I argue that Heidegger's formal-indicating method show us how phenomenological concepts can play an essential role in the elaboration of regional ontologies. Besides, I also suggest that Heidegger's approach can be further developed so that regional ontologies become relevant for the phenomenological method itself.

I do not provide here a detailed account of the concept of formal indication. Instead, I focus on how this concept operates in Heidegger's briefly (but very interesting) remarks on what he calls "primitive world" or "primitive Dasein" [Ga 02; Ga 21; Ga28]. Accordingly, the problem of interdisciplinary phenomenology is here considered only in relation to the possibility of a phenomenological (cultural) anthropology. In so doing, I also discuss Philip Tonner's original idea of phenomenological paleoanthropology [Tonner 2018].

In the first part, I show how the formal-indicating concept of *Verweisung* ("indication", "reference") allows Heidegger to distinguish a plurality of structures of meaning, like for example "signs" and "tools", and therefore to define different kinds of "sign". In the second part I turn the attention to Heidegger's definition of the primitive world as characterized by "fetishism" and "magic" and on his interpretation of these structures as peculiar forms of sign. Thus I emphasize some difficulties in the way Heidegger understands the primitive world in negative terms, namely as a world in which signs are not (yet) discovered as they are in ours (namely, as signs). Nevertheless, I claim that Heidegger's general approach does allow a rigorous and fruitful application of phenomenological method to cultural anthropology, first of all, questioning the validity of empirical concepts such as "humanity", "civilization", "barbaric" and even the category of "primitive". I better define this phenomenological approach as it follows: in Heidegger's perspective phenomena like fetishism and magic are considered as factual and yet *essential* variations of the *ontological* structure of world; therefore, these phenomena can be individuated as objects of a regional ontology, to be carried out through regional *variations* of formal indicating concepts (i.e. being-in-the-world, indication, sign). In the conclusions, I contend that phenomena such as fetishism and magic, and more in general anthropological data and findings, might also have a positive impact on phenomenological method, for they invite us to question the alleged neutrality of formal indicating concepts (i.e. sign, authenticity, death, everydayness) e therefore to redefine these concepts accordingly.

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## To Thematize a Concept: Heidegger and the Phenomenology of the Inapparent

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Martin Heidegger's specific, unexpected reference in his Zähringen seminar of 1973 to a "phenomenology of the inconspicuous" pointed the way to what would become one of the developments in phenomenology that this conference exists to investigate. It was not as if the word "inconspicuous" (or "inapparent") and what, later, would come to be recognized as its traces, had played no part in Heidegger's earlier thought (as one need only open *Being and Time* to discover)--not as if it had been "unheard-of" before. It was rather that, as this proposal will not be the first to note, the term "inconspicuous" in Heidegger will itself have been, like what it named: *inconspicuous*--unheard-of--as of special import for an understanding of Heidegger. His nod to it in 1973 altered it, brought it into focus, gave it a special stature, and opened it to possibilities for meaning that, earlier, had gone unrecognized. How?

It served to thematize it, and so give rise to a potential focus for phenomenology important in its own right as well as of special relevance for the study of Heidegger. The process of this thematization in

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the Heidegger scholarship—of the making of this concept into a Heideggerian *event*--reveals itself in a history of the concept's scholarly recognitions and the enlargement of possibilities for its meaning as critics come to apprehend them in Heidegger. Jason Alvin undertakes a brief such history in his recent study, "Making Sense of Heidegger's...*Phenomenology of the Inconspicuous*." There he also enlarges our awareness by noting specific appearances of the concept in selected examples of the philosopher's works. But a measure of the potential importance of this concept in a single work comes to fullness in Alvin's noting certain of its appearances in the Parmenides seminar of Winter Semester 1942-43. Here the concept of the inconspicuous, amplified by the scholarship's growing awareness of the changing ways the concept emerges in Heidegger's language as he brings these ways to light, adds to our understanding of the range and subtlety of his thought in this connection. It is as if the "inconspicuous" and its cognates carry the burden of the seminar as definitively as do the more statically conceived binaries, "concealedness" and "unconcealedness" that are counterparts in the Greek word *alétheia*, on the meaning of which the *Parmenides* is a meditation.

The burden of the *Parmenides* is to "think the thought the thinker [Parmenides] ha[s] thought" when in his poem he speaks the name of Truth (and, ongoingly for Heidegger, the name of Being), that of the early Greek deity *Alétheia*. For Heidegger, this means pondering this word's meanings as exhaustively as a semester allows and closely examining its *Lethe* aspect, whereas he had earlier, and ubiquitously, emphasized it's a- or non-Lethe import.

I should like to look again at the *Parmenides* in order to show that Heidegger's work there, variously languaging the inconspicuous, may be more pervasive than even Alvin's meticulous reading divines. For example, words that Heidegger himself may fix at one point with an unmodifiable meaning ("Lethe is the concealed") will, even as he languages his understanding, also subtly, and surprisingly, reveal modes of movement and change that had remained inconspicuous.

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### Heidegger Interpreting Plato's *Phaedrus*

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"A *primordial* struggle (not just polemic) is the kind of struggle which first *creates* its enemy and assists its enemy to the *most incisive antagonism*" (M. Heidegger, course from 1931/32 on Plato's *Cave Allegory* and *Theaetetus*, GA 34, English transl., p. 66). Heidegger then adds: "But is all this really to be found in the fourth stage [of the Cave Allegory]? Or have we violently inserted it?" (idem, p. 67). How should we understand this "creation" (*schaffen*)? How does Heidegger "create" his Plato by translating and interpreting him? Is this not a violent approach to Plato and to any other thinker? In which way is Heideggerian hermeneutics based on a "creation of the Other"? In my presentation, I would like to focus on Heidegger's interpretations of Plato from the years 1931/32 (which are to be found in the course mentioned above, as well as in the 1931/32 seminar on Plato's *Phaedrus*, GA 83). As I argued elsewhere (Minca, "Heidegger's Return to the Cave. The Interpretation of the Platonic *Cave Allegory* and *Theaetetus* as an Early Indication of *Kehre* and *Ereignis*", in: *Heidegger Studies*, 33/2017), it is my belief that Heidegger's key concepts of *Ereignis* and *Kehre* make their first (hidden) appearance in this years and in this interpretation of Plato. Firstly, I will briefly analyse Heidegger's method of a hermeneutical-translative reading of Plato from the course in GA 34, and show how Heidegger hermeneutically *needs* Plato in order to grasp what he will later call *Seinsgeschichte*. His way of translating-interpreting Plato is deeply indebted to his way of thinking truth as *Entbergbarkeit*, "deconcealment", i.e. as the most original antagonism between hiddenness and unhiddenness (*a-letheia*).

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In a second step, I will focus on his reading of the *Phaedrus*. The term “creation” (*schaffen*)—which can also be detected in the courses and papers from the years 1931/32 as *vorbilden* (“to form”) and *entwerfen* (“to project”)—will be analysed from the perspective of Heidegger’s interpretation of the nature of the soul (*psyche*) in Plato’s *Phaedrus*. The soul’s immortal nature is “care” (*epimeleia*, translated by Heidegger as *Sorge*).

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## The Idea of Phenomenology as the Science of the Origin

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The search for the origin (*Ursprung*) (primordial experiences, primordial knowledge etc.) is one of the most fundamental leitmotifs in the history of phenomenology. Main representatives of phenomenological movement, such as Husserl, Fink, Heidegger, Patočka or Landgrebe, not only speak very often about “origin” or “primordially” (*Ursprünglichkeit*) but also they directly define phenomenology in terms of origin and its derivatives. However, the object of their interests is typically *that what* functions as the origin – for example: absolute transcendental subjectivity, living body, *Dasein* or *das Ereignis* etc. The origin in this sense I call a *material* meaning of the origin. Apart from the question about the origin in material sense, one has to provide a proper phenomenological analysis of phenomenon of the origin in *formal sense*, i.e. to answer the question: what is the origin *as origin*? In my presentation I want to start with this question. It should be exposed thereby that the metaphor of the origin, that underlies phenomenological investigations, is *essentially* connected with the idea of phenomenology. To achieve that goal it is necessary to perform an explicit analysis of the essence of the origin. The phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of the origin (a specific circularity that is something ‘harmless’ for phenomenology) will make deeper grounding of phenomenological methodology possible. The essential character of the origin that it is always *hiding itself* will make it understandable that, for example, the concrete steps of phenomenological method have the character of *returning* (both Husserlian and Heidegger approach to ‘phenomenological reduction’). Then I would like to show that phenomenology, restricted only to that formal dimension (phenomenology as phenomenology of the origin in formal sense), has to be necessary *deformalized* and modified to a concrete search for the origin of *something* (sense, phenomenon, appearing itself etc.). It will be showed thereby which limits and obstacles wait for a phenomenology understood this way. The phenomenological analysis of the origin reveals that origin is not pre-given (*vorgegeben*) and has to be achieved only by proper methodological procedures. Phenomenology has to start with something non-originary and *return* to the origin itself. The starting point determines ultimately the phenomenological accessibility of the origin. Phenomenology has to deal with some primordial phenomena which mark the limits of phenomenology. I would like to show that – on the level of deformalized phenomenology of the origin – the openness of the field of understanding of sense of phenomena (whether we conceive it subjectively or a-subjectively) is at the same time the limit and the condition of possibility of phenomenological analysis. It will partially contribute to – using the phrase from Fink – “phenomenology of phenomenology” which belongs to its most primordial essence.

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## Subjectivity in the Encounter with the Other: Derrida and Waldenfels

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Levinas's philosophy was very important for Jacques Derrida and Bernhard Waldenfels in many aspects. Levinas criticized Husserl and Heidegger and stated that the most important thing for an identity of subjectivity is not the already given *Jemeinigkeit*, but the appeal of the other. Each thinker developed this idea in his own way. My focus is on one issue: the importance of encounter with the other for the constitution of subjectivity.

Derrida gives one of the most interesting of his descriptions of an encounter with the other in his book "The Animal That Therefore I Am". It starts with the situation where he notices his cat's gaze at him. He was nude and felt ashamed.

This was the starting point for him to ask about the forms of being-with and being-alongside with the singular, irreplaceable other. He questioned the difference between humans and animals. But the most important question for Derrida is who I am in the gaze of the other. He takes it from Levinas that an encounter with, an appeal from, and the gaze of the other play a very important role in the constitution of subjectivity, but his situation remains paradoxical nonetheless. In Derrida's description, the cat appears as a point of self-reflection on oneself as a subjectivity; but, at the same time, Derrida questions and deconstructs all possibilities of transposing oneself into the animal's mind. So he remained locked in the aporia: The gaze of the animal constitutes me, but because its gaze is inaccessible and enigmatic, I also remain in an enigmatic state as a questioned subjectivity.

Waldenfels's phenomenology of the alien can help to understand what is lacking in Derrida's encounter with the cat. Derrida's description ignores the dimension of intercorporeity and it should have paid more attention to the structure of it as an event. An encounter with the other is not a regularity, nor is it fully aporetic. Waldenfels proposes to think about the other in territorial terms and think about an encounter in terms of pathos, event, appeal, and response. An appeal of the other comes from elsewhere, from beyond the threshold, from a territory which is not accessible to me. This appeal questions, affects, changes me. We should think here about subjectivity as affected, relational, pathic, and responsive. It is not only questioning of the subjectivity that plays a significant role, but also the interaction with the other. This interaction has its own logic of response, which is not universal. So, instead of the enigmatic subjectivity in the face of an inaccessible and enigmatic other, we should talk about a pathic and relational subjectivity which takes a concrete identity in an encounter with the other. That is a matter of the phenomenological description.

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## Belonging Somewhere: Journeys and Dwelling

Eveline CIOFLEC (*Lucian-Bлага-University, Sibiu / Eberhard-Karls University, Tübingen*)

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In my paper I will discuss the topic of "belonging somewhere" as related to the interlacement of the phenomenological approach with intercultural philosophy. The latter proposes taking into account the cultural and hence historical background of experience, discourses of experience and practice in different cultures. Admitting historicity and differences in practices and beliefs, phenomenology turns towards cultural approaches and reaches out into the question on whether an intercultural approach to experience is possible. Phenomenology then moves forward towards questioning the alien, besides the

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strangeness within experience, which can never be entirely overruled. (Waldenfels, 2007) However, from this background, the topic of “belonging to” reaches out into social-political questions on the right to belong.

Personal identity is formed by belonging to certain communities and places. Yet, belonging isn't a status or a quality of the individual, but rather a practice, meaning being involved with, including somehow acting in relation to what it is one belongs to. Considering belonging to as being a practice, a whole new perspective on identity is revealed. There is room for explaining why identity can change; why even apparent cultural backgrounds aren't necessarily explanatory.

What Heidegger calls ‘dwelling’ is based on this fundamental characteristic of belonging which implies more than just being related to (Heidegger 1977). Together with this aspect of dwelling, namely the aspect of belonging, the concept of ‘home’ becomes central. Based on this conceptual background, I investigate the concept of identity as being relational and defined by ‘belonging’, also considering Edward Casey’s reflections on being “homeward bound”(Casey 1993), as well as J. W. Duyvendak’s work on the politics of home (2011).

Along with the question of identity the question of self-determinacy shows up: Am I free to choose where I belong to? To which extent am I determined by heritage, and to which extent can I choose freely by different practice? To put it more concrete: Can I choose to belong to a place where language, religion and lots of every-day habits are different than the one I grew up with? What Goethe calls ‘Wahlverwandtschaften’ (elective affinities), could in this context be seen as looking for a definition of ‘home’. Specific forms of the present mobility of people make many of us struggle defining ourselves as belonging to a certain region, a certain place, a certain state.

Apparently, personal identity remains bound to the place – as cultural and, with Taylor (2001), moral space – of origin and is reflected in the actual experience or self-understanding of individuals. Yet, a closer view on ‘belonging to’ might reveal a different type of self and self-understanding. It might turn out that individuals are much more permeable and can ‘endure’ and integrate many more changes than assumed; many more values than proposed by some system, and all of this without any relativism. Hence, we might simultaneously belong to different places, all of which shape our identity. One hint in this direction has been given by Casey, when he mentions the journeys of Basho and Odysseus (Casey 1993). Journeys reveal how, based on the sense of belonging, places we live in shape the identity. On journeys we do not just pass through some place, but we both shape and are shaped by that place (see Stenger 2006). What the human right to belong then means will briefly be discussed conclusively.

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## **Judging, That Thinking Which Also Acts. An Existential Reading of Arendt’s Political Judgment**

Ileana BORTUN (*Alexandru Dragomir – Institute of Philosophy. Romanian Society for Phenomenology*)

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This presentation pertains to a post-doctoral research project through which I intend to develop an existential ethics (that I previously configured in my doctoral thesis, starting from Heidegger’s existential analytic) through a phenomenological approach to political judgment – starting from Arendt’s account of judging, based on her political interpretation of Kant’s reflexive judgment.

Given that within the framework of the existential ethics the connection between thinking and acting has to be thought more originary than the dichotomy theory–practice, the aim of my presentation is to argue, through an existential reading of Arendt’s account of political judgment, that judging could be seen as that type of thinking which is, in

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itself, open towards action – not in order to guide it or to norm it, but in order to receive from it, i.e. from the face-to-face interactions, its own validation.

1) Firstly, I will discuss Arendt's strict distinction between thinking and acting. Often, she refers to it as if indicating an incompatibility, based on the historically proven tension between philosophy and politics. Phenomenologically, however, the incompatibility between thinking and acting is not sustainable.

2) Fortunately, we can find in Arendt's account of political judgment enough support for the argument that judging is a type of thinking that is compatible with action and which, furthermore, can be interpreted existentially, in the framework of Heidegger's hermeneutic of facticity. I will show that, from an Arendtian perspective, there is an incompatibility between action and *philosophical* thinking, not thinking per se. Thus, Arendt's judging can be interpreted existentially, as *understanding* – in the sense developed in *Being and Time*, and rather different from Heidegger's later developments in this respect, e.g. from *Letter on "Humanism"*, where the dichotomy theory–practice is criticised, but action seems to be somehow closed in the sphere of thinking ("Thinking acts insofar as it thinks.").

3) Finally, I will argue that, from an ethic-existential perspective, judging (inter)acts in the sense that it imagines the possible (better said: the future) interactions with others, leading not only to an enlarged mentality (as Arendt says, following Kant), but also, and more importantly, to an enlarged *identity*, precisely because it involves imagining oneself in the place of another.

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## Deficiencies of Heidegger's Phenomenology and Genesis of Phenomenological Marxism

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It is well-known that the political is thematized in the early Heidegger's phenomenology as the part of public sphere, i.e. as the part of human existence in the mode of unauthenticity. For the first time the rehabilitation of the political is fulfilled by Herbert Marcuse in phenomenological Marxism by the means of his criticism of Heidegger's philosophy in a phenomenological manner. In the article I intend to answer two questions:

- 1/ How is phenomenological Marxism possible;
- 2/ What are phenomenological means for the rehabilitation of the political.

There are four main moments of Heidegger's philosophy attractiveness for Marxist thought.

- 1/ The criticism of the actual reality as a unauthentic mode of human existence (*das Man*) in connection with the criticism of reification and bourgeois consciousness.
- 2/ The criticism of fact and metaphysics of fact (positivism, Spengler's physiognomy of history and Hegel's system) as the enforcement of actual reality.
- 3/ The explication of *Dasein's* spatiality in connection with the concept of labor (*Arbeit*).
- 4/ The explication of historicity through the renunciation (*Widerruf*).

There are three main tendencies in Marcuse's criticism and transformation of the Heideggerian historicity conception.

Disclosure of the omitted by Heidegger authentic spatiality (*Raumlichkeit*), phenomenologically considered, and its fundamental role in the constitution concrete, i.e. the determinate with the material, social and political character of *Dasein* and world, historicity. Concretization of *Dasein*, its treatment not as an individual or nation (*Volk*) but as a class considering substantial differences of an

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environment (Umwelt) and modes of Dasein's movement along the interconnection of references (Verweisungszusammenhang), material conditions of its existence. Deformalization of the Heideggerian historicity Dasein treatment. An explication of the material substance of historicity as the decisive character of the conditions of the human existence (Dasein).

Rehabilitation of public sphere thereby of the space of the political struggle as the sphere of authenticity follows from both deformalization of historicity and concretization of Dasein. As the result of the rehabilitation the class struggle is interpreted phenomenologically as the concrete form of Dasein's historical motility (Bewegtheit) and the revolution as the concrete form of renunciation (Widerruf).

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## Phenomenology as Immanent Critique

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In the Marxist tradition, the immanent critique of society is a critique which derives the standards it employs from the object criticized, that is, the society in question, rather than approaching that society with independently justified standards. The standards at stake entail functional norms of our society as well as unrealized normative potentials that are present in the social body as such. While there seems to be a relative agreement concerning the basic principles of immanent critique, its methods are widely discussed in the most recent contributions to the field of critical theory. Drawing upon the critical perspective developed by Robin Celikates in his *Critique as Social Practice* (2009) and by Rahel Jaeggi in her *Critique of Forms of Life* (2018), my contribution will reflect on the possibility of understanding the phenomenological method itself as a specific avenue for immanent critique. My claim is that understanding phenomenology as immanent critique can only become possible if we are ready to reconsider the nature of the criticism entailed from the very beginning in the phenomenological method in the light of contemporary social criticism. Drawing upon Husserl's epistemological critique and on Levinas' ethical critique, my aim is to show that phenomenology embodies an immanent critique whose goal is to bring our various forms of life closer to the life they unceasingly configure and reconfigure, in their dynamism and their mutual confrontations.

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## Husserl's Anarcho-Communism

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In this talk I aim to vindicate Husserl's so-called political anarchism by presenting its foundations and main features. My talk is structured in three parts. In the first part, I analyze Husserl's ethical project, in order to reveal the ethical ground of his political statements. In the second part, I extract the anarchist conclusions focusing in the role of the State for Husserl and the privacy of the means of production. Finally, I conclude by arguing that Husserl developed a genuine anarcho-communist theory. This is relevant, since it allows us to build new relations between Husserl's project and other anarchists theories of his time, just as E. Malatesta's and L. Fabbri's anarcho-communism.

In his famous *Husserls Staatphilosophie*, K. Schuhmann suggests for the first time that Husserl's ethics and even his whole phenomenological project have anarchist implications, if we consider it from a political point of view. Schuhmann did not further develop this hypothesis and, until now, no one has

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submitted it to evaluation. This is not surprising, considering that Husserl has not been read as a political philosopher. However, recent works on Husserl's ethics allows questioning this assumption in favor of a political reading of the phenomenological project (cf. Miettinen, Timo: 2013. "The Body Politic: Husserl and the Embodied Community"). Following this line of thought, the argument I will develop runs as follows.

In the first part, I show briefly how the ideal of renewal proposed by Husserl in his *Kaizo* articles means a self-transformation of the three dimensions of reason (theoretical, practical and affective) (Hua XXVII, 42). This transformation for the subject concludes with four important ideas. A) The possibility of becoming a better subject, that is, the possibility of progressing in a subject's own life shows that the whole life of the subject is imbued with a teleology which tends to perfection (Hua VI, 15; Hua XV, 378). B) Consequently, all human products should be evaluated in its alignment with human progress (Hua XXVII, 56). C) Besides, once the renewing subject engages in a self-critic of her affective life, she can discover the difference between the mere instinctive love and the ethical love. Ethical love is thus understood as the authentic way to recognize the value of life (Hua XIV, 174). D) When the loving of the subject turns ethical, two aspects of the instinctive love are eliminated: the idea that the nearer ones (family, fellow citizen, etc.) should be loved and taken in consideration first than the farer ones, and the idea that it's necessary a spontaneous "falling in love" to love someone. In doing so, the ethical subject becomes a lover of humanity (Toulemont, René: 1962).

In the second part of my talk, I show the anarchist implications of this ethical framework. Given (B), are evaluated on its rationality the existence of the State and the private character of the means of production. That analysis shows, on the one hand, that the State (understood as coercive laws) is justified only because it could restrain irrationalities which can stop the realization of the human progress. This implies that a progressive rationalization of the subjects implies a progressive becoming-useless of the State. In the other hand, given (D), the rationality of the privacy of the means of production depends only upon the possibility that everyone could satisfy her needs, not merely the material ones, but also the ones to self-realize the own life.

In the third part, I suggest briefly the originality of Husserl's anarcho-communist proposal by comparing his view about the State with Malatesta's view. The idea of an exhaustive comparison is presented as a future project.

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**Emmanuel ALLOA**  
University of Fribourg

## **Experiences we go through. From Sensations to the Institution of the Self**

Merleau-Ponty's critique of sensation cannot be disentangled from a radical redefinition of subjectivity. Connecting the early criticism of sense data with the later explorations around the notion of "institution," the point is to show how a self is not a mere receptacle for sensory contents but is instituted as a self through the very experiences it undergoes. Experience is not a thing we "do" or "have," but something we go through and something through which we become what we are. From a recapitulation of Merleau-Ponty's account of sense-emergence as a Gestaltist process and the analysis of the negative, diacritical structure of the experiential field, the argument moves to the mute demands of sensible environments ("affordances") and the types of embodied responsiveness they call for. Affective, "pathic" events that touch the subject are also what simultaneously brings the subject into existence. Consequently, subjectivity appears as the field of becoming, a becoming shaped through sensible requests and instituted by means of the creative responses given to the requests put forward by other beings, things, and subjects.

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18.30–18.45 Coffee break

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18.45–19.15 CEESP Business Meeting

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## The Frame and the Body. For a Phenomenology of Virtual Environments

Anna Caterina DALMASSO (*Saint Louis University, Brussels*)

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In the past few years, as virtual reality approaches large scale and mainstream consumer use, a vibrant ecosystem has emerged. Immersive and interactive virtual environments perceived through head-mounted displays make us increasingly familiar with the experience of being incorporated into a new and autonomous world, conveying the feeling of being in a place other than our physical location, in a so-called frame-free infinite space, no longer limited by the boundaries which have traditionally characterized our perception of images.

Hence, virtual environments have come to challenge our understanding of embodied spectatorship and aesthetic experience, and force us to further explore the stakes of the debate developed in the last decades by various phenomenologies of the film experience (Sobchack 1992 and 2004; Del Río 2010; Barker 2009).

In a way, virtual reality brings us to face an epistemological shift in the conception of spectatorship, similar to the one that was brought forth in the history of cinema by the introduction of depth of field and long take, which aroused a radical reassessment of the role of the spectator (Bazin 2004) or, in Dufrenne's words, the spect-actor (1981). Indeed, these aesthetic constructs and visual strategies oblige us once more to think of the spectator's experience not just as an essentially passive reception, but as an "active" participation (as it is constantly involved in an attribution of meaning and progressive readjustment of it), that the notion of interactivity is inadequate to describe (Manovich 2002) and the enactive approach has just begun to explore, still lacking the tools for investigating the specificity of the virtual image.

Thus, in taking into account an image that co-constitutes with the movement of an embodied gaze, the role of phenomenology is decisive and allows us to question the relationship between the visual field and the virtual horizon that we experience through virtual reality. In particular, I aim to turn around the general idea that in virtual environments the visual field is *frameless* or, to take on the expression of Mexican director A.G. Iñárritu, set free from the "dictatorship of the frame". In fact, although virtual environments allow the experiencer to access a 360° tridimensional space, the human visual apparatus will always determine a cut into a potentially unlimited visual field, revealing only a portion of the visible at a time—or, in Husserl's phenomenological terms, through successive *Abschattungen* (2014). Therefore, to understand the viewer's experience in virtual reality, we need to focus on the constant discontinuity and aberration brought about by the very movement of the gaze as much as on its immersive aspects. In Maldiney's words, we need to "give back to the gaze what makes it a gaze", that is, "its marginal field and horizon" (2003). To this end, I will develop the hypothesis that if in virtual reality the frame of the image, understood as the historical construct since Renaissance Art, seems to disappear, then the very function of *framing*—that is the mobile limit operating an ontological cut in the visible and sensible world of the viewer—does not dissolve, but, rather, is carried out by the experiencer's body, understood as the first medium of perception (Merleau-Ponty 2005).

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## “Am I Really Feeling It?” Quasi-Emotions and Quasi-Values in Cinema

Claudio ROZZONI (*IFILNOVA/New University of Lisbon*)

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The recent debate on film spectatorship shows a great proliferation of studies ranging from visual-cultural studies, *Bildwissenschaft*, analytical philosophy to the cognitive sciences and neurosciences. Productive though this debate is, it often lacks a philosophical account of the ultimate presuppositions involved in this burgeoning wealth of interdisciplinary studies. Deeper investigations in this sense are being called for on all sides.

First of all, I endeavor to show how the in-depth analysis of the Husserlian manuscripts on ‘image and phantasy’ gathered in ‘Husserliana XXIII’ address several aspects that have been overlooked or misunderstood by many contemporary theories of film images. More specifically, I will stress the fruitfulness of a phenomenological investigation concerning two thematic lines, linked one to another: (i) towards a philosophical account of the relation between film images and reality (ii) towards a contemporary development of phenomenological concepts such as “quasi-emotions” and “perception of values [*Wertnehmung*]”.

Among film images, the ‘classical’ division between documentary and fiction might prompt one to discriminate between emotional reactions to reality and to fiction. Indeed, a distinction could be drawn between real emotions and *quasi-emotions*, a differentiation already made by Husserl (as well as by another Brentano’s pupil such as Meinong and his student Witasek, see Vendrell Ferran 2010) that has now become a major focus in several fields—for example, in the analyses developed in analytic philosophy over the past 40 years (Carroll 2013; Currie 1997; Walton 1978) and philosophy of mind (see for example McDowell 1998). I intend to show how the current debate on *quasi-emotions* could find in its unnoticed phenomenological precursor a philosophical account more focused on the moment of experience. In order to aptly fulfill this task, I will question whether and how the emotions experienced in fictional film are *qualitatively* different from those we experience in documentary film, and, ultimately, in reality.

Besides, I claim that any investigation into the peculiar quality of emotions experienced through images must incorporate a philosophical account of the moment of *belief*. Husserl already showed how this notion plays a primary role in the constitution of perception in ‘flesh and blood’. However, my paper aims to shed light on its pivotal role in the constitution of *film images* claiming to represent reality. This proves to be particularly urgent as regards a current account of the ‘emotional’ threshold between documentary and fiction. Indeed, the presence or the absence of the moment of ‘belief’ in our experience of images can affect our emotional reactions to them. Finally, my analysis has to take this issue one step further by questioning how this discussion can influence our experience of values when looking at the cinematic screen. Since a value is something that can appear to us only through an appreciation that is *felt* (see Roeser & Todd 2014; Tappolet 2000), I will even go so far as to ask whether—on the basis of the aforementioned distinction between real emotions (with belief) and *quasi-emotions* (free of belief)—one may also distinguish between real values and *quasi-values* elicited by film spectatorship.

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## Permanent Ellipsis: On Viewer Imagination in One-Person Films

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In this paper I start from acknowledging the recent cinematic trend toward what are essentially one-person chamber plays – a trend that comprises films like *Buried* (2010), *127 Hours* (2010), *Locke* (2013), *The Call* (2013), *All Is Lost* (2013), *Den Skyldige/The Guilty* (2018) and *Arctic* (2018). These films can be helpfully distinguished according to how they toy with the viewers' sensory imagination and, more specifically, the way they make them mentally visualize what is omitted and suggested: While *centripetal* films like *127 Hours* or *All Is Lost* focus on the perception of the presented onscreen space and the way the characters have to cope with it, *centrifugal* ones such as *Locke* and *Den Skyldige* refer to absent spaces and actions therein that are only alluded to by the film via extended or even permanent lateral ellipses (on the latter concept, see Kirsten). My presentation is particularly interested in the ways such centrifugal chamber plays keep the viewer's sensory imagination constantly at work and derive their dramatic tension from what is effectively invisible.

I argue that the film's dialogues – through what elsewhere I have called *suggestive verbalizations* (xxx) – invite the viewer to engage in mentally visualizing the absent scene, even while visually perceiving the onscreen action. Phenomenologically speaking, the spectator's field of consciousness is temporarily reorganised. The spectator's film reception, based primarily on the *perception* of material images and sounds, draws more than usual on his or her immaterial visual or aural imagination. (The term 'imagination' here refers to the capacity of the spectator to make something *absent* present [see Casey; Sartre]). Viewers thus have a conscious, albeit hardly ever reflected-upon 'experience of mental superimposition' or 'double exposure experience': their mental visualizations are placed 'over' their perception of film images or sounds. In other words, perception and imagination link and complement one another phenomenologically to form a complex aesthetic experience. The paper will hint at possibilities toward a phenomenological aesthetics of the film experience along the more general lines suggested by Ingarden (1973) and Dufrenne (1973).

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## The Autonomy of Reason and the Identity of Phenomenology: Material Phenomenology in Question

Paula LORELLE (*FNRS/Université catholique de Louvain - Fonds Michel Henry*)

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This paper intends to question phenomenology's identity and shifts in functions, in a systematic manner, from its conception of reason.

One will first argue that the general identity of phenomenology in opposition with sciences and natural sciences, rests upon a "sensibilization" of reason. Phenomenology's rationality constitutes itself by refusing an objective rationality that would be wrested from sensible experience. The only way for reason to access phenomena as "life" or "perception" is to regain its own lively and sensible dimension — to become a "*logos* of the aesthetics world" (cf. E. Husserl, *Hua* XVII) in Husserl, to melt into the senses and structures of perception in Merleau-Ponty (cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Œuvres, Phénoménologie de la perception*) or, more radically, to appear to itself as life's originary self-affectation in Henry (cf. M. Henry, *L'essence de la manifestation*).

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However, this first movement comes along with the opposite tendency of reason to free itself from sensibility and to regain its autonomy. An autonomization that, as one will argue, constitutes an internal principle of division within historical phenomenology, and the source of a tension between its different functions. One will distinguish three different forms and instances of this autonomy.

—The *objective autonomy of reason*. Phenomenology as a “descriptive psychology”, in the *Logical Investigations*, still serves a “pure logic” that seeks to elucidate reason’s infinite objectivity (cf. E. Husserl, *Hua XVIII*).

—The *transcendental autonomy of reason*. The return to the lifeworld, in the *Crisis*, ends up in the description of life’s pure and transcendental operations (cf. E. Husserl, *Hua VI*).

—The *affective autonomy of reason*. The return to reason’s originary affectivity, in the *Essence of Manifestation*, leads to the very autonomization of affectivity, now conceived as a pure and non-sensible self-affectation (cf. M. Henry, *L’essence de la manifestation*).

One will eventually focus on Michel Henry’s paradigmatic expression of this tension, in order to question the relevance of the “*material*” identity and function of phenomenology. On the one hand, material phenomenology pushes to its limits reason’s sensibility and accomplishes phenomenology’s radical identity and function. Essence gains its most material and corporeal dimension, becoming the originary “how” of manifestation or life’s affectivity. On the other hand, phenomenology still assumes the function of a “first philosophy” which seeks for the essence’s absolute autonomy. This leads to the very autonomization of affectivity — now conceived as a non-sensible self-affectation — and subverts the phenomenological relevance of these descriptions. Can a material phenomenology be refunded independently of this function? Can the description of the essence’s radical materiality be freed from the quest of its *selbständigkeit* or autonomy?

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## The Three Dimensions of the I and Its Three Sciences. Where Does the Body-Soul Belong?

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In his *Ideas II*, Husserl carries out a series of analyses of constitution taking as a guiding thread a division of being in three distinct ontological regions: Nature, Animalia and Spirit. The region of pure consciousness was already presented and extensively described in the first book of the *Ideas*. While nature is the region of *things* in their exact, mathematical being, the regions of consciousness, living beings and culture correspond to a tripartite division of levels or dimensions of the I: the pure (transcendental) I, the empirical or embodied I (in the *Ideas II* also known as the soul or the body-soul unity - *Leib-Seele Einheit*) and the spiritual I or person. The first one appears as a first result of the phenomenological method of the epoché and transcendental reduction. It is no more than the subjective pole from whence intentionality as a constitutive function and attention emanate, giving rise to the noetic-noematic correlation (HUA IV, pp. 97 and ff). The pure I, taken as *concretum* together with its habitual tendencies, makes up the Monad (*Hua IV*, p.111; *Hua IX*, §43). While this pure I is the *constituting one*, both the empirical and personal Is are *constituted*, are objective correlates of the pure I itself. The first one is constituted as an embodied I, with a lived-body (*Leib*) that performs kinesthesia, receives sensations and has its own biological drives (*Hua IV*, §30). The spiritual I is the person, just about as it is understood in the natural attitude: living in a world, intertwined in social relations, with a history and personality, and most importantly guided by the law of motivation (*Hua IV*, pp. 185 & 220). Phenomenology assumed the task of performing this systematic division itself, based on the description of consciousness and the analysis of constitution. It must, therefore, offer the necessary clarifications

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for each of them through the phenomenological method. But at the same time, in doing this, it reveals a “division of labour” regarding these regions and levels of the I. While phenomenology can offer the constitution analysis of the natural thing, it falls onto physics to describe this region. Pure consciousness is the exclusive domain of phenomenology (pure or phenomenological psychology). The region of the spirit (*Geist*) is the domain of the social or human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*). What about the Animalia region? To a great extent, it is the domain of biology. But in this region we also find the body-soul. This “middle” I is constantly described by Husserl as being natural and spiritual. Although it is the predominant conclusion in this work that the soul is natural and its corresponding science is a naturalistic psychology, “the same” soul is characterized as predominantly spiritual a decade later (Cf. *Hua IX*, §21), being a *Geisteswissenschaft* the appropriate science. On this opportunity, I wish to thematize this tension that arises in that domain where consciousness meets body. The clarification of this “limit” region that the soul conforms, is of fundamental importance to fight the advancing force of reductionism, while at the same time recognising the importance of biology and neuroscience for the understanding of consciousness in general, and these levels of the I in particular. It will be my guiding hypothesis, following Husserl’s own intellectual development, that the body-soul I must, problematic as it may be, encompass both natural and spiritual elements and be scientifically studied in manner that honors its intricacy.

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### The Roots of Husserl’s Notion of Horizon

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It is well known that Husserl derives his notion of horizon from William James’s notion of fringe. He himself acknowledges this fact. In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936), Husserl says that “W. James was alone, as far as I know, in becoming aware of the phenomena of horizon—under the title of ‘fringes’.”

In his 2012 book *The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology*, Saulius Geniusas, speaks of a long history of the notion of horizon, explaining that “the *philosophical* application of the notion of the horizon can be traced back at least to the Neo-Platonic context of the doctrine of emanation.” But Geniusas is stressing that his aim is “to show that Husserl is the philosopher to whom we are to this day indebted for having transformed the metaphorical employment of this term in the history of philosophy into a specifically philosophical notion and a specifically philosophical theme.”

Although James uses the term horizon synonymously with fringe, his notion differs from Husserl’s in a sense that it does not include intentionality. Apart from this, both notions are founded on the idea of specious present as presented in the book of an anonymous writer: *The Alternative: a Study in Psychology* (1882). The phrase “specious present” was meant to describe some peculiar features of time consciousness, e.g. the fact that subjective present “is really a part of the past — a recent past — delusively given as being a time that intervenes between the past and the future.”

Both concepts fringe and horizon, are based on the idea of unity of consciousness as presented in Brentano’s 1874 book *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. But the very idea of the unity of consciousness James traces back to James Wills’s paper “An Essay on Accidental Association” (1846) whom he quotes in relation to this point.

But William James does not mention Wills’s remarks about time consciousness. This is strange because these remarks can be understood as providing a definition of specious present. Namely, Wills says that “our present is somewhat analogous to the ship’s horizon, which still appears the same though the place is changed; and thus, too, are we possessed of a broad expanse, from which to search back,

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and if we observe to how large an extent the ideas which exert our attention to-day are but a continuation of yesterday.” This point also passed unnoticed by Holly Andersen and Rick Grush in their 2009 paper “A Brief History of Time Consciousness: Historical Precursors to James and Husserl.” Since the mistake is not corrected by Saulius Geniusas in his 2012 book *The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology*, the aim of this paper is to show that the real roots of Husserl’s notion of horizon are in Wills’s analysis of consciousness.

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## Subjects of Violence, Stories of Violence

Ion COPOERU (*IRH-ICUB, University of Bucharest / Centre for Applied Philosophy, Babeş-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca*)  
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The concrete experience of the vulnerability, seen both as an interbodily interaction and as a modification of the symbolic ordering of a particular society, is not only ubiquitous, but also hard to grasp by the concerned individuals or by the researchers.

In social contexts, it is related to oppression and domination and consists, on one side, in the destitution the subject from the social tissue, and, on the other side, in blocking her or his capabilities. A phenomenological analysis of violence will bring about the integrality of the subject, i. e. the interplay of bodily aspects with those pertaining to affect, cognition and the symbolic order in which she or he emerges *as* subject.

Shifting from the destitution of the subject to her or his restoration, I’ll stress out the role of narrativity in overcoming the consequences of violence. The key point in this approach is to restore or supplement the capability of the subject in order to give voice to her or his feelings and to connect them to her or his immanent sphere. I’ll examine the ways in which phenomenology might contribute to the finding of a language of the unspeakable. This approach will point to a (bodily) subject that is envisioned as an intrinsically capable subject (of expressing, resisting, overcoming, and becoming).

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## Violence between Sense-Destruction and Sense-Making

Remus BREAZU (*IRH-ICUB, University of Bucharest*)  
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In recent years, violence has become a privileged topic for the phenomenological endeavours. Authors such as Michael Staudigl, James Mensch, James Dodd, Burckhard Liebsch, or Cristian Ciocan, dedicated many articles or books for clearing up the meaning of violence. Specifically, James Dodd, in his book, *Violence and Phenomenology* (2009), has formulated what are, in his opinion, the main problems for any phenomenological analysis of violence: (1) violence and possibility, (2) violence and selfhood, (3) the legacy of violence, (4) violence and responsibility, therefore (5) the meaning of violence, which encompasses the first problems, and, last but not least, (6) the relation between violence and evil.

In my presentation, I aim to add some contributions to the debate regarding the fifth problem—the meaning of violence—emphasising its relation with possibility and selfhood. More precisely, I address

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the relation between violence and sense-destruction and sense-making, which is tackled by James Mensch and James Dodd. James Mensch, for instance, in his article “Violence and Embodiment” (2008), defines violence as “destructive of sense or meaning.” Moreover, in “Violence and Selfhood” (2013), Mensch explicitly attempts to refute a perspective that takes violence as sense-making, referring to Hegel’s dialectic relation between slave and master and to what James Dodd named “Schmitt’s challenge.”

Against Mensch, I argue that violence can be sense-making, relying on Heidegger’s description of angst from *Being and Time*. I show that violence is one of the core elements of Heidegger’s method, and angst is privileged by Heidegger precisely because of its violent “effect.” Whereas angst provide us with a proper destruction of sense, it is nevertheless sense-making. Moreover, it is not just an ordinary sense-making, but a privileged one, one that provides the human *Dasein* with her being-itself (*Selbstsein*). I also trace this matter in other writings of Martin Heidegger, that is *The Basic Problems of Metaphysics. World – Finitude – Solitude*, where boredom has a similar function, or *Introduction to Metaphysics*, where Heidegger interprets some lines from Sophocles’ *Antigone*, in order to explain the human nature and its relation with being in terms of overwhelming (*deinon, das Überwältigende*), and violence (*Gewalt*). I show that Mensch’s rejection of Hegel’s and Schmitt’s positions does not hinder Heidegger’s position and, therefore, violence preserves its “inherently problematic character,” as James Dodd says in his last book, *Phenomenological Reflection on Violence* (2017).

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## From the Phenomenon of Torture to the Social World. Rethinking the Question of Intersubjectivity

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This study seeks to offer a phenomenological analysis of what it is called *social world* (in Schutz’s terms), taking as point of departure the particular case of violence through torture known as Pitești Phenomenon. This violent experience concerned the young anti-communists who were taken as prisoners (between 1954-1951, during the communist regime in Romania) and had the purpose to impose them *the re-education* – a method of torture meant to make them reciprocally humiliate each other, by forcing them to be informers on their friends and, finally, to torture each other. In this way, through physical and mental destruction, the “re-educated ones” would be born again, by admitting that deserved all the abjection and torture they were subjected to, having now the honor of becoming the torturers of new inmates.

The fact that within the phenomenon of torture we are confronted with an impaired and privative intersubjectivity is fundamental for the understanding of the social world which should be framed not only from the perspective of everyday interactions between people, but also from the perspective of the limiting-cases as the violent situations. Therefore, my main objective is to offer a phenomenological reading of the social world starting from its *privative dimension* – which consists, as in the mentioned case of torture, in the impossibility of any genuine interpersonal relation between the violated subject and the violating subject. The *first step* of my paper is meant to reveal the phenomenological implications of the torture exercised within Pitești Phenomenon. Here, I will employ Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity and I will investigate how, precisely, through torture, the ego is violated in its intersubjective structure of experience and how this leads to an altered form of inter-relationality. The *second step* will provide a phenomenological analysis featuring the “because-motives” and “in order-to-motives” (Schutz) of the violent action exercised by both torturer and victim. By doing so, I hope to show why the phenomenon of torture sheds important light upon the experiential

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layers of the social world and how, exactly, this outcome deepens the understanding of the intersubjectivity, in any given context.

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## Should Phenomenology Abandon the Concept of Horizon?

Mikhail BELOUSOV (*Russian Presidential Academy for National Economy and Public Administration*)

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In *Logical Investigations* Husserl introduces the non-presumability as the main principle of phenomenology. From then onward the principle plays crucial role in his work and works of the greater part of his most influential followers. The principle implies that in order to be the unprejudiced description of the phenomena as they are, that is, as intuitionally given, phenomenology must exclude any premises transcending the givenness.

Still, the classic phenomenology makes seemingly self-contradictory attempt to combine the non-presumability with the principle of horizontality. The horizon is the infinite reference from an actual givenness to the *potential* one, i.e. the reference to what is *not given* yet, determining the sense of the actual givenness. Then to have the access to the phenomena in their givenness, phenomenology must transcend it towards pre-given horizon, and, therefore, always implies the premises.

One of the most notable tendencies in post-phenomenology became an effort to overcome this ambiguity through the departure from the concept of horizon as depriving the phenomenological experience of true non-presumability. The tendency acquires the central methodological role in the works of Jean-Luc Marion. According to him, only by overcoming the principle of horizontality can phenomenology gain access to the givenness transcending any horizon – the one of the event or the “saturated phenomenon”. As an impossible experience, the event is the excess of the givenness in relation to horizon, not vice versa. Since, for Marion, the phenomenology grounded methodically by Husserl can account only for the phenomena fraught with the overflow of horizon in relation to givenness, or, in ideal case, with their equality, it doesn’t allow for true unconditional givenness of the event.

The paper argues that, contrary to Marion, the classical phenomenology provides a conceptual means for combining the givenness of the event with the principle of horizontality. In demonstrating this, I turn to two different descriptions of the said ideal case, which have central methodological function in corresponding versions of the phenomenology: the act of final fulfillment in Husserl and being-towards-death in Heidegger. I am going to show that in those descriptions the non-presumability coincides with the horizontality in the experience of the impossible possibility. On the one hand, the complete fulfillment of the expectations implied by horizon makes horizon *disappear as horizon*, because it leaves *no potentiality* and, therefore, transcends the horizon as *impossible* experience. On the other hand, the experience makes horizon *be given as horizon*, since it coincides with itself and, hence, becomes itself through the fulfillment. By coinciding with itself the horizon transcends itself as it becomes *pure horizon* going beyond any *possible* givenness. The ambiguous experience of horizon and givenness transcending themselves towards each other constitutes *new* horizon.

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## ***Eudaimonia* as Project and Meaning-Horizon. Eugen Fink on Aristotle's Concept of Happiness**

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The moral philosophy of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century revived the significance of virtue ethics and with it the Aristotelian concept of happiness underwent an intellectual Renaissance. However, the major discussion was to large extent limited to the framework of the analytical philosophy, even though the phenomenological movement brought its own insights into these matters as well. The contribution will address the question of the nature of happiness from the phenomenological point of view. Eugen Fink in his interpretation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* identifies the concept of *eudaimonia* with phenomenological terms of project (*Entwurf*) and meaning-horizon (*Sinnhorizont*). This conceptual shift from Aristotle's own terminology offers interesting merging possibilities of Aristotelian moral philosophy and phenomenological method.

In contribution I will aim to show that Eugen Fink's use of phenomenological terminology in the context of Aristotle's moral philosophy is justified due to the fact that phenomenological descriptions of the meaning of human life converge with Aristotle's insights on the nature of human *praxis*. In this regard it is important to characterize Aristotle's search for the ultimate good as attainable by human being and her or his actions. If such ultimate and finite good does not exist or cannot be found, all our actions are in vain and literally meaningless. This good has to represent the life as a whole, be complete (*teleion*) and self-sufficient (*autarkes*). These crucial features are inherent to *eudaimonia* which as such good functions as a warrant of meaning and meaningfulness. Furthermore, Aristotle nuanced his position from that of Plato and his followers and points out that this ultimate good is not universal Platonic idea, which could serve as an abstract paradigm or a general rule, wherefrom could be derived an appropriate action in given particular situation. If this is not the case, how does right action become manifest?

It is here where we can see the phenomenological relevance of Aristotle's practical philosophy as well as aptness of phenomenological terminology in its interpretation. Every action is embedded in the horizon of meaning which more or less represents the "wholeness" of human life or life in "general". For Fink this representing horizon functioning as background co-constituting the meaning of particular action is *eudaimonia* as Aristotle understood it. This meaning horizon is constituted as *Entwurf* into which we project ourselves. *Eudaimonia*, thus, is not merely passively felt emotion that comes after the action, but as a project it precedes the action as a sort of *causa finalis*. It is the manifestation of the fact that *Dasein* is a relation to her or himself aiming not only to live, but to prosper and live well in the first place. In other words, in Aristotle's concept of *eudaimonia* is inherent the ontologically crucial fact that human being is that of interest in own being, which at the same time is at odds with Heidegger's original concept.

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## Judgment and Space. Towards a Phenomenology of Communication

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### 1. Judgment or Perception?

Can one believe communication to be a fundamental phenomenon of human world and at the same time perception to be a primary element of human consciousness?

The ultimate and indispensable level of every communicative practice is a set of judgments, questions, and suppositions. Perceptions cannot play the role of a universal and fundamental communicator, even if they are extremely active. Perception cannot give anything to another person; it cannot communicate any information, any feeling, emotion, etc. In Communication a negation and objection are possible, and there are positive as well as negative judgments. However, there cannot be any negative perception. Shouldn't phenomenology refuse from the dogma of precedence of perception over judgment?

Phenomenology begins with the thesis that an act of presentation (or representation) (*das Vorstellen*) is a basic stratum which underlies all other modes of consciousness. The famous Brentano's thesis, which Husserl accepted in general, runs as follows: "This act of presentation forms the foundation not merely of the act of judging, but also of desiring and of every other mental act. Nothing can be judged, desired, hoped or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing" (Brentano 1995, 61). In Husserl presentation as perception becomes the basic mode of consciousness and a sample for structuring of all other types of intentionality. Husserl's doctrine of subjective time also corresponds to the understanding of perception as a continuous process that proceeds in the inner consciousness.

However, the positions of both philosophers are different in relation to inner experience. In fact, Brentano's concept of inner perception brings to the fore judgments. Every mental act contains an inner perception, or inner consciousness of itself, and the latter is nothing else as the inner judgment, as Brentano himself called it. It is considered as a necessary element of every act of consciousness and as the only source of evidence. In this sense judgment is omnipresent; it is necessary part of every wakeful consciousness. In respect of inner consciousness Husserl's position is different: Husserl's reflexion rather looks like as inner observation than inner judgment. In LU V, §6 Husserl tried to transform Brentano's inner judgment, which, as he believes, can give us only a narrow field of evidence, to inner flowing perception. Thus, Husserl accepts the primacy of perception and representation also with reference to inner experience.

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Chair: Cristian Ciocan

**Claude ROMANO**  
Paris-Sorbonne University

**Why Phenomenology Should Abandon the Ego  
and Adopt Ipseity Instead**

I attempt in these reflections to show the originality of the conceptuality of ipseity, in the wake of the early Heidegger and Ricœur, with respect to the traditional conceptuality of the ego or the self, which has dominated phenomenology (and contemporary philosophy as a whole), despite some exceptions. Actually, I intend to highlight not only the originality of this conceptuality and its irreducibility to the “problem of the self”, but its superiority. Although the intent of the present paper is not exegetic, to argue in favor of this claim involves also an interpretation of what is at stake in Heidegger’s and Ricœur’s doctrines.

## **Promising to Give the Other What She Does Not Want. Perils, Accidents and Deficits of Love in Jean Luc Marion's *The Erotic Phenomenon***

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Jean Luc Marion's phenomenological inquiry in love takes place in the first person singular for he wishes to speak of love in the very same way as he loves, from the point of view of the man that he is, namely by way of abstraction from his experience that involved amorous episodes with women. As a consequence, Marion does not refer to other thinkers and theories on love since his aspiration is to return to things themselves. Nonetheless, it is possible to trace through his writings numerous influences from phenomenologists like Jean Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas, a fact that he does not deny himself and even admits that it is perfectly possible. Marion claims that the assurance of the ego results from the erotic reduction, i.e. that I am in so far as I am loved. When I am loved, I take flesh, i.e. I am feeling myself via the Other. Only my taking flesh assigns me to myself, gives me my unique individuality, grants me my ipseity and delivers me to myself. Taking flesh is thus an effect of the Other; I am assured of myself from elsewhere, from an excessive exteriority that Marion names flesh, a matrix of which I become conscious by the commerce with the world as this happens through my relation with the Other. Marion's notion of flesh is imported from Merleau-Ponty's late phenomenological work and specifically from his seminal essay "Eye and Mind." This is my point of departure. I suggest that Marion does not have an adequate account when this commerce with the world fails and taking flesh is doomed, in exactly the same way as Merleau-Ponty also fails to account for instances of discordance with the world and the Other. It is true what Jacques Lacan says that the Other gives me what she does not have, namely my flesh, but the question remains about what happens when the Other refuses to give it to me, what kind of commerce with the world occurs in frustration and castration. There is an attempt from the part of Marion to think of such cases of frustration when he recognizes that I may be because someone wills me from elsewhere in the form of hatred. Yet Marion's theory works better in cases of felicitous love rather than in cases of calamitous liaison. My task is to inquire why.

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## **Counter-Flavoured Intentionality**

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The background idea of my talk is that major changes in the history of phenomenology require changes of its primary tools, that is, of its basic concepts, distinctions, or arguments. To succeed in opening new and viable paths for the phenomenological movement, requires that the new set of tools be strong.

I elaborate on this idea by taking a closer look at Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of givenness. Is its new set of tools strong enough to open a new and viable path for the phenomenological movement? The variety of criteria at hand for assessing the strength of tools is large. I use only one

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criterion, namely *consistency*, and deal with only one primary tool, namely the basic concept of *counter-intentionality*.

In order to serve the purpose of the phenomenology of givenness and to get a firm grip on the concept at issue, counter-intentionality should be defined, following Marion, from both a *positive* and a *negative* point of view: 1. it is to be understood as the intentionality of the other, and thus as ensuring a free and authentic manifestation; 2. it is to be understood as neutralizing any other form of intentionality, and thus as setting aside any form of a priori limits imposed on manifestation. Counter-intentionality brings about a new phenomenality and transforms the subject into a mere consequence of the encounter with givenness, that is, into an *adonné*. Phenomenology of givenness deals with all these matters.

In order to assess the consistency of the concept of counter-intentionality, I choose to approach it, again, from a double point of view. *From a logical point of view*, counter-intentionality is subsumable to intentionality, conceived as the *aboutness* or *directedness* of mental states. It appears, thus, that the dichotomy at work in Marion's phenomenology, between intentionality, in any of its forms, and counter-intentionality, derives from a narrow understanding of the *aboutness* or *directedness* of mental states. The reason for this narrowness can be easily spotted from the other point of view I chose for assessing the consistency of the concept of counter-intentionality. *From a phenomenological point of view*, counter-intentionality, according to Marion, transforms the subject into a sheer receiver of the givenness of the other. But is this receptivity of the 'subject', even if we were to equate it with utter passivity, incompatible with intentionality? The mental states of a receptive, even passive, subject are still *about* or *directed at* something. They still possess intentionality. What is more, the intentionality of a receptive, even passive, 'subject' still interprets, as it phenomenizes according to its own resistance, what is given.

Consequently, the main claim of my talk is that the concept of counter-intentionality is not inconsistent, but only as long as Marion refrains from understanding the intentionality of the other as neutralizing the intentionality of the 'subject'. In such a situation, with the 'subject' still possessing intentionality, is an absolutely free phenomenality nevertheless possible? Can the phenomenology of givenness nevertheless overcome metaphysics? Is the theory of saturated phenomena as paradigm of phenomenality nevertheless possible? Can the 'subject' nevertheless be understood as *adonné*? The answer to all these questions seems to be negative.

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## Marion's Counter-Method as a Way of Reconstruction of Phenomenology

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In my paper I will examine phenomenological reduction as understood by Jean-Luc Marion in its relation to Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl's phenomenology. I intend to operate on the notion of "counter-method" defined by Marion (Marion, 2002). In my presentation I claim that reduction in Marion's philosophy is a radical version of phenomenological method which: 1) is strictly determined by givenness, therefore 2) it is able to reveal that the phenomenological subject is actually *sub-jected* (Nielsen, 2005) to what gives itself, what, in turn, amounts Marion's method to 3) the inverse relation between intention and intuition which Derrida claimed to be dependent on originary difference. Finally it 4) leads to „re-construction” of phenomenology as a method.

According to Derrida, phenomenological reduction opens to the transcendental field of experience, but it *ipso facto* suspends identity between sense and fact (Derrida, 1973). Here the relation becomes eventually irreducible difference which can never be accomplished. However, according to Marion's

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principle: so much reduction, so much givenness (Marion 1998), and thus reduction is a passage from indistinct phenomenality to pure givenness. The latter no longer—like a reduced phenomenon in Husserl’s account—can be constituted by transcendental *I*, and it cannot be evidently seen either. Therefore, considering givenness as a phenomenological condition of reduction, it has to be comprehended as a movement which cannot be accomplished without reducing itself. Reduction seems therefore to be a movement of revealing that can be performed only as a response to the call of what gives itself, i.e., of a phenomenon.

I claim that counter-method, so understood, leads to ‘subject’ which is not transcendental anymore. Moreover, Marion’s subject, called by him ‘*interloqué*’ shifts the difference pointed out by Derrida: subject no longer anticipates due to its intentions, but now it can only initiate a hermeneutic movement. The latter—as I intend to show—is the way of performing phenomenological reduction. Finally, reduction becomes a way of interpreting the phenomenon’s call.

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### **The Cinematic Image. Cinema between a Deleuzian and a Phenomenological Approach**

Diana BULZAN (*Academy of Fine Arts, Vienna, Austria*)

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The present paper concerns itself with the problem of outlining a methodology for the study of cinema as a philosophical concept. For this purpose, the paper will mostly refer to the cinematic image as a sensible image, as something to be perceived and therefore inherently tied to the subject’s conditions of possibility of experience. Consequently, two different approaches will be addressed and compared, the first one being anchored in Deleuze’s treatment of cinema in his study of the movement-image and the time-image, while the second will examine the issues and complexities of phenomenological approaches, particularly the way it frames the relation of the viewer to the screen. Throughout the paper, the specificity of the cinematic image will not be defined, but rather addressed indirectly through the methodology it requires – the deleuzian approach proves itself valuable mostly because, although filled with film analyses, cinema is treated as a philosophical concept in its own right. Namely, the specificity of the cinematic image is tied to its inherent relation to the concepts of movement and time, while the relation between the subject and the world is expressed/actualized in the arrangement of the frame. That being said, the passage from the movement-image to the time-image also speaks to a change in the conditions of experience of the subject as the sensory-motor link tying the subject to the world is dissolved. This is to be taken as an entry point in the phenomenological method, as it brings forth the connection between cinema and experience. Nonetheless, the deleuzian approach will be considered as a critique of phenomenology (the dissolution of the sensory-motor link as a critique of the phenomenological analysis of the subject), as well as placing the specificity of the cinematic image in montage, in the elements within the frame and not in the relation of the viewer to the screen. However, the latter speaks to a dimension arguably lacking in Deleuze’s analysis, namely the social aspect of this relation. Therefore, the last point will be to ask how cinema participates in the creation of a certain visibility at the social level. It is for this point that a phenomenological approach needs to be re-investigated, starting from the inherent connection between cinema and experience.

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## Deleuze the Phenomenologist

Mircea MORARIU (*Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania*)

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Gilles Deleuze's approach to the history of philosophy involves creatively deforming a philosopher's system in order to produce a new version of it, a "monstrous child" that nonetheless said the same statements that the thinker had said, only in a displaced and decentered way that the latter might not have agreed with. This "method" was also applied by others to Deleuze himself, including one line of inquiry which considers him to be a phenomenologist writing from within the phenomenological tradition rather than against it from the outside. This interpretation differs from other similar creative endeavors by requiring not only a rethinking of Deleuze's philosophy, but also a change in the way phenomenology itself is understood and defined. Many of Deleuze's statements about phenomenology are polemical however and the task of considering him a phenomenologist should be judged by its productive aspect, its capacity to produce new meanings and connections, rather than by its truth or falsehood in relation to authorial intent.

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## Phenomenology after Deleuze

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Deleuze's relationship with phenomenology is ambiguous to say the least. For his interpreters and critics, the assessments of Deleuze's relationship with phenomenology range from mutual opposition, such as in Éric Alliez's suggestion that Deleuzian thought is an expression of "the impossibility of phenomenology", to a recognition of their commonalities, as in Badiou, Agamben or Knox Peden's reflections on the shared problematics between Deleuze and thinkers such as Heidegger. Within his own oeuvre, phenomenology and its existentialist off-shoot play an important, if often downplayed, role: his earliest texts are written under the distinct mark of Sartrean philosophy, and he frequently returns to philosophers like Husserl and Heidegger throughout his work, both in his treatment of topics such as difference or subjectivity, and in his overall characterization of his philosophy as a "transcendental empiricism", which resonates with the original project of phenomenology. Moreover, Deleuze's readings of phenomenology are instrumental to the thought of more recent philosophers who tackle the problems posed by phenomenology, both within and outside its tradition, philosophers such as Ray Brassier, Levi Bryant, Graham Harman, Bernard Stiegler, John Protevi and others. My presentation will concern itself with three lines of inquiry, namely: what are Deleuze's main theoretical acquisitions from and criticisms towards phenomenology, how does Deleuze's relationship with phenomenology fit in the particular context of post-war French philosophy, and how has Deleuze's engagement with phenomenology opened up new problems and theoretical vistas for newer generations of philosophers, both within phenomenology and in the wider post-phenomenological theories.

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## The Pathic Dimension of Sense Straus, Maldiney and Affective Neuroscience

Louis SCHREEL (*Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University*)

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In his teleological interpretation of the affective, Aristotle made a fundamental distinction between the dimensions of *poiein* and *paschein*, *acting* and *being-acted-upon*. In my paper, I will pursue Erwin Straus' view that this distinction contained the germ for an approach that today has led to a cognitive-psychological approach, in which the teleological horizon of *pathè* has been replaced by the mechanistic functioning of emotions (Straus 1956; Straus 1960). On the other hand, I hope to show that this Aristotelian distinction also indicates a more originary kind of affectivity, which is at the heart of Henri Maldiney's concept of *transpassibility*.

In contemporary cognitive-psychological or neurobiological theories of emotion, which seek to complement the cognitive view of man as rational animal with the emotional grounds of cognition, only one single *telos* connected to emotions remains intact. Emotions are understood in a rational-mechanistic manner as somatic indications that evaluate the consequences of our actions. Emotions thereby view our actions in light of only one *telos*: their utility for survival.

Following Heidegger and Straus' revaluation of Aristotle's teleological (ontological) interpretation of the affective, Maldiney (2007) has transformed the evaluative component of the affective into a concept of *drive* as an embodied evaluation: it are drives, not mere biological instincts, which identify and evaluate affectivity. His analyses reveal an ontological dimension inherent to the affective that distinguishes human existence from organic life: not a mere fluctuation of homeostatic states, but a dynamics of *opening up* and *closing off*. The highest *telos*, which human existence strives for most of all, is in Maldiney's transpassibility an abyssal *emptiness*. To reach this state of affectivity, the mind must itself let go of each *telos*, each 'why', each conscious kind of striving.

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## Aurel Kolnai's Phenomenological Method and Emotions

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In spite of the many important findings made within the theory of emotions, scholars still struggle to find a consensus for what an emotion is. In view of the promise of scientific method, more often than not, the concept of emotion is formed on the basis of scientific findings (neurobiology, biology, evolutionary theory etc.) thus spiraling the understanding of emotions into a narrow path. In contrast to much of the contemporary literature on emotions, I aim to show that phenomenology can help to enrich these findings by providing an alternative, broader conception of emotions.

The underlying aim of this paper is to show that even the earliest phenomenological accounts can enrich current scientific approaches to emotions by enabling new approaches and broadening new perspectives. In order to achieve this goal, I will begin this paper by outlining Aurel Kolnai's approach to phenomenology, his phenomenological method as well as the influence Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Alexius Meinong and others had on it. Then, I will briefly present Kolnai's findings on the emotions of disgust, pride, hate as well as situate them as key elements in forming his own but also further advancing Scheler's conception of value-ethics. In order to show how a phenomenological approach to emotions can enrich current scientific conceptions I shall direct my

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attention towards Paul Rozin's scientific approach to disgust and his findings, ideally, presenting a possibility of a collaborative relation between phenomenology and current research methods.

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## "Messianic Pathologies" and Existential Feelings. A Case Study in the Inner Life of Ideas

Lorin GHIMAN (*University of Art and Design Cluj-Napoca*)

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The paper aims to verify the viability of Matthew Ratcliffe's "existential feeling" as an explanatory tool when concerned with historical phenomena of philosophical thought. Ratcliffe himself notes that such existential feelings can "crystalize into thought", and, citing W. James, and newer research, expects they are in some way responsible for specific "epistemic policies". We intend to put this hypothesis to work in discussing the German-Jewish interwar intelligentsia and its "messianic pathologies" (Bloch).

Ratcliffe's term is technical, pertaining to the research field of affective phenomena and finding its use especially in the study of mental disturbances and disorders, but draws on philosophical work, especially from the phenomenological tradition. It starts from the observation that whenever "I have an emotional experience of *p*, perceive *q*, or think about *r*, I already *find myself in a world*." Existential feelings "constitute a sense of *how one finds oneself in the world as a whole*", "a felt sense of reality and belonging" that bears a resemblance to Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit*. Ratcliffe's analysis moves towards a description of them as pertaining to the ways in which "things matter". Depending on the intrinsic 'readiness', to incur changes, one could isolate rigid existential feelings, like for instance in the cases of depression, and easily changeable up to the point of being disorganized feelings, that typify schizophrenic disorders. Other kinds are metonymies of the general openness to possibilities (excessive – diminished, excessive – constraint) and are subject to evolution in time.

In spite of their background role in our experience, the existential feelings present a degree of sophistication that puts them closer to 'higher', cognitive processes, and links them directly with the philosophical inquiry. Ratcliffe's proposition is that "some existential feelings amount to broad philosophical dispositions, which motivate the explicit positions that philosophers defend".

This could furnish a more grounded explanation for the study of philosophical ideas and groupings. Ratcliffe himself has not passed the line of superficial attempts to verify this proposition, though this seems necessary not only for strengthening the case for the existence of existential feelings as a category as such, but also to provide more depth to his rather sketchy classification.

The case chosen here is the "messianic pathologies" as Ernst Bloch named them. The intellectual history of the German-Jewish interwar intelligentsia is teeming with anecdotes and textual examples that pertain to a messianic symptomatology. There is Landauer's decree during the brief Munich Republic banning the study of history in public schools, Lukacs' "great new philosophy" described in the journal of one of his friends in which the homogenous world is seen as the goal of salvation, Löwenthal's stern refusal to commit, Benjamin's idyll with suicide, Ernst Bloch's seemingly obnoxious demeanor in the eyes of respected men of scientific authority, Adorno's abhorrence of "marching behind some flag" that exasperated his students and peers, Rosenzweig's and Benjamin's fulgurations, Kracauer's go-for-broke game against the linear history of the world, etc.

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## Perceptual Shifts and Binding Processes within and across Sensory Modalities in Remote X Audio Tours: What can Phenomenology Bring to these Debates?

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In recent years, many artists have been staging itinerant performances (soundwalks) that invite spectators to walk in the urban space or within a specific place (*site specific art*), while listening to sound and narratives that either echo or interfere with their actual surrounding sonic environment. In this paper, I will analyse the particular aesthetic experience coming into being in such performances: an experience of “between” which brings about a destabilization, even a collapsing of the borders between the “real” and the “fictional”, as well as a collision of frames and an overlapping of different perceptual fields. Specifically, I will focus on the peculiar shift from one order of perception to another that punctuate the spectator’s walk, as well as on the transgressions between the imaginary and the real that he experiences at the level of his own phenomenal body while moving in the surrounding and immersive sound-space.

Some of the questions I will go into, include: is this process (of perceptual oscillation) determined solely, or at least primarily, by staging and sound recording techniques (*in site binaural recording*), which aim at stimulating a perceptual shift at a specific moment in the performance? Does it also — and if so, to what extent — depend on the particular disposition of the perceiving subject that, consciously or not “tunes” their perception accordingly? Or, does the perceptual shift/oscillation occur regardless of staging and sound recording techniques or the perceiving subject’s intention? In this talk, I will address this set of interrelated issues, aiming at clarifying the perceptual phenomenon here at stake and its conditions of emergence. To quickly outline the structure of my talk:

First, I will look at two case-studies taken from Janet Cardiff’s *Walks* and the audio-tours *Remote x* by *Rimini Protokoll.*, which will be analyzed with regard to the particular perceptive multi-stability and oscillation between real and imaginary perceptions they cast into high relief.

In a second step, I will compare the phenomenological evidence gathered to Husserl’s theory of perceptive *phantasia* and its connection to perceptive experience (by analyzing a few chosen texts from the *Lectures on Phantasy, image consciousness, and memory*) and discuss how far it can account for the aesthetic phenomenon here at stake.

In a final move, by drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s late phenomenology (*L’oeil et l’esprit* and *Le visible et l’invisible*), I will discuss to which extent it constitutes a crucial step in the extension of a phenomenology of perception to the realm of imaginative associations consistent with the performances considered.

Overall, by reinvestigating Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, I hope to demonstrate that many issues raised by these itinerant performances (soundwalks) have already been anticipated by Merleau-Ponty and, in turn, place a spotlight on his phenomenological approach as the most pertinent and insightful to articulate both the nuances (complexities) and the depth of the aesthetic experience here in question.

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## Situatedness in a Digitized Lifeworld

Dakota ROOT (*École Normale Supérieure, Paris*)

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Merleau-Ponty's theory of embodiment conceptualizes how the body influences experience and shapes perception. Embodiment posits the body as unique framing perspective, a central point of orientation that immerses the self in the experiential world. Much attention has been focused on embodiment offline, but few scholars have addressed how the bodily self relates to virtual experiential life. With increasing use of Internet-connected objects and digital tools, the ways humans and technology interact and develop together must be revealed. Embodied self-experience is a means to analyze both the limits, and expansive possibilities of technologically mediated experience.

First, through an analysis of situatedness in Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*, I will explore how the self grasps itself through possible actions in and interactions with the environment. The situated body interacts with the environment and situated objects via its innate powers of movement, and the body as an instrument for understanding gives objects significance through world-engagement. Next, exploring object incorporation into the body schema through examples from Don Ihde's *Embodied Technics* and *Bodies in Technology*, I consider how consoles, laptops, phones and other technological tools can become aspects of self-understanding via relations and habits.

Embodiment appears to delineate the limits of immersion into the digital, but Merleau-Ponty's bodily self is world-related, and in grasping itself, incorporates experience of the surrounding milieu. As use of avatars and immersion into VR become natural components of movement and perception, the body's use of digital tools will be a progressively transparent part of real behavior. If bodily interaction in the world is key to having a self, then consistent experiential practice in virtual worlds and virtual reality is producing a self that is not split between digital and physical, but understands itself through both.

The digital and the physical are increasingly intertwining; the apparent divide between factual and virtual, online and real may no longer be an adequate description of experience. This presentation argues that although embodiment directs attention to the limits of virtual worlds and virtual reality, these domains are not apart from the lifeworld, but are absorbing into it. A bodily self draws meaning and sense from the relation of innate powers of movement and awareness in and towards the world, so that when the surrounding environment is digitized, self-understanding and self-experience are reshaped.

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## The Spatial Self: Accounting for the Subject within a Phenomenology of Public Space

Ben CARPENTER (*University of East Anglia, UK*)

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This paper seeks to develop the role phenomenology plays within the construction of the self within a political context. As such, I am exploring the interdisciplinary relevance of philosophy across deconstructive, critical, and queer theory, as well as its salience within the political philosophy of contemporary identity politics. The project brings together three central

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concerns: the notion of subjective or lived experience, the role of shared public spaces in the formation of the subject, and conditioning influence of political power over both of these.

Beginning with Sara Ahmed's *Queer Phenomenology*, I explore how phenomenology informs the notion of 'lived experience' that is often appealed to within contemporary identity discourses. Using Ahmed's language of orientation, I examine how our notions of identity have a fundamentally phenomenological component with particular interest in using this to explore the spatiality of political identity. The central question concerns how political power shapes our experiences of the self within and through the construction of public space. Such spaces are described as 'spaces of appearance' by political thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, though her work does not provide us with a phenomenological account as to how subjects appear within political space. Of course, this is furthermore a question of who can appear and on what terms, and the pursuit of this question entails an exploration of what kinds of life are constructed as liveable, both in the sense of what kinds of lived experience count as legitimate and in the sense of what kind of phenomenological experiences become possible within conditions of power.

I seek to develop an account of the situatedness of subjects within the context of political power that breaks from the increasing tendency within contemporary identity discourses to rely on various naïve spatial and cartographic metaphors. On such accounts, space is considered as a ready-made facticity wherein bodies move. Instead, my account follows Ahmed's desire to 'reanimate space' by considering the cartographic process of map-making as expressions of particular organisations of epistemic power. Through uniting these concerns of lived experience, public space, and political power, I seek to explore how phenomenology can serve as an indispensable tool within the context of political philosophy – allowing us to reconsider our notions of both the self and political space.

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17.00–17.15 Coffee break

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**Keynote Speaker**

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17.15–18.30  
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Chair: Ion Copoeru

**Bruce BÉGOUT**  
Bordeaux Montaigne University

**Phenomenology and Climatology.  
From the Concept of Climate to that of Atmosphere**

The emotional effect that environment has on sensibility has been remarked since the Greek thinkers. For a long time, this theory of climates and moods dominated medical and political thinking. We propose to explore the possibility to change the modern model by promoting the ambient category in order to replace the more obscure and ideological category of climate.

18.30–18.45 Closing Remarks  
Ileana BORTUN  
(*Romanian Society for Phenomenology*)

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19.00 Reception